Why Ilhan Omar Won (and the mistakes her detractors made)

Two simple answers:  1)  She received more votes than her opponents; and 2)   She was the incumbent.  The first answer is obvious, so is the second, but neither are the end of the story and there are lessons to why she won and what it may mean going forward.

Congressional incumbents have significant advantages, that is why their normal re-election rate is 95-98%.  Those advantages are name recognition, money, use of office for constituent service, generally a pre-existing campaign structure in place, and prior experience in winning.  Omar had all this.  Yet as I noted in my piece in The Hill, the best time to put an incumbent is when they first run for re-election.  When that happens and the challenger narrows or eliminates the incumbent cash advantage, the latter’s chance for re-election approaches 50-55%.  That is where Omar was—she was still the favorite and Antone Melton-Meaux had to run a great campaign and have a perfect storm to win.  He did not.  He and his supporters made several mistakes, and Omar did not.

            First, what Omar did well was yet again recreate her social media campaign strategy that got her elected to the Minnesota House in 2016 and the US House in 2018.  She used that social media strategy effectively to reach Millennials in two previous campaigns and appears to have done that again.  Most of the mainstream media and analysts failed to observe this campaign technique—it is the 2020 version of private lawn signs or phone calls to supporters. She held her base, got out her supporters, and therefore received more votes than her opponent.  Moreover, Minneapolis and the Fifth District are but one example of a generational and demographic shift in the US where control of the Democratic Party is shifting to Millennials and Gen Z and away from Baby Boomers.  Omar benefitted from this.

            Melton-Meaux made several mistakes.  One, as was party of their strategy according to many I talked to—was to maintain a stealth campaign and not announce until the last minute in order to have the element of surprise.  But this surprise campaign came at a big cost—not providing sufficient information to voters about who he was or that he was even running.  Stealth campaigns produce stealth candidates who generally lose.

            Second, Melton-Meaux apparently had no or little social media campaign.  At a time of decreased mainstream television viewership, especially among Millennials and Gen Z, the failure to reach out via social media was a problem.  But connected to this issue is what appears to be a third failure—a limited ground game.  With all the money going into this race both to his campaign committee and via PACs, they seemed to think that television advertising or air wars was enough to win.  Ground wars, get out the vote, phone banking, contacting voters, is critical and this was missing from the campaign.

            Melton-Meaux not being the endorsed candidate meant he did not have the DFL party to support him.  The big winner in Minnesota on Tuesday was the DFL whose muscle provided the ground game for all endorsed candidates, including Omar, and that made a difference.  Again, as a stealth candidate lacking a campaign infrastructure, he was at a marked disadvantage to Omar.

            Finally, but perhaps not the last reason, Melton-Meaux worked for a law firm with a union-busting reputation.  This made him an excellent target for labor.  Had Melton-Meaux’s  supporters introduced and vetted him publicly much of this might have come out or his backers might have realized this as a liability and gone for someone else.

            Overall,  many factors contributed to Omar’s win.  But perhaps one could argue that  if Melton-Meaux’s supporters could not defeat Omar their hope  was to scare her.  Initial post-election comments do not reveal that and Omar comes out of the primary perhaps stronger than  before.  What lessons she and her detractors take from this primary are  yet to be seen.  Conversely, for those who publicly endorsed  Melton-Meaux,, they are weaker as a result.

            Going forward, though, it is not too early to think about 2022 if Omar decides to run again.  It will be after redistricting .  Right now, the Fifth Congressional district seems a good    fit for her with 60% of the population within the city of Minneapolis.  Consider some statistics.

            For the 2010 census, the average congressional district was 711,000 individuals.  According to the Census Bureau, as of August 12, 2020 the US population is 330,112, 127.  This would make the average district population 758, 878.  The estimated 2020 Minneapolis population is 435, 885, making it about 57.5% of the district.  Not much of a change compared to 2010.  Yet it is too soon to tell what the Fifth Congressional district will look like.  We do not know for certain if Minnesota, for example, loses a congressional seat.  All this is to say that  while for now Omar probably is safe and strong in a currently configured Fifth District, demographic shifts in a new districting, as well as the result of the 2020 Minnesota state legislative races complicate what Omar’s and all the other districts look like in the state.