The Education of Donald Trump

Slowly but surely the presidency of Donald Trump is being normalized.  By normalized it is

meant that the Trump presidency is increasingly being captured and confined by the institutional powers and realities of American and world politics.  This is something that Steve Bannon feared, and which both Trump’s supporters and distractors should recognize.

There is an old political science and political adage that declares that presidents have more authority and freedom to act internationally than they do domestically.  This is because while the structures of the Constitution–such as checks and balances and separation of powers–limit the domestic power of presidents, they are more free to act internationally, especially with either congressional acquiescence or affirmative grants of power.  This recognition that presidents have more autonomy internationally is rooted in famous Justice Robert Jackson concurrence in the 1952 Supreme Court case Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer.  Yes, in many ways this dicta is correct constitutionally, but it misses something far more powerful when it comes to defining presidential authority; specifically the political and institutional constraints on presidents and how, as Stephen Skowronek argues in Presidential Leadership in Political Time, how history and context defines presidential power.

Back in 2008 during the US presidential elections when lecturing in Europe I was asked how the presidency of Barack Obama would differ from that of George Bush in the area of foreign policy.  I argued that the best predictor of a new president’s foreign policy was to look to his predecessor’s.  Presidents really have far less freedom to depart from the past than many think.  The foreign policy establishment is big and powerful in the US and it largely bipartisan.  Geo-political forces such as  the state of the world economy, the political interests of other nations, and the overall limits on US power and reach too further define what presidents can do.  Yes some may claim some presidents made major shifts–Nixon and China–but the changing geo-political role of China in the world made such a choice inevitable.

Obama proved that.  After making numerous promises, the Obama foreign policy was defined by choices made by Bush. The war on terror continued, troops remained in Afghanistan and Iraq, Gitmo was not closed, drone attacks persisted, and the US did not fundamentally change Middle East politics even after the Arab Spring opening because entrenched support for Israel did not change.  Even Obama’s effort to make an Asian pivot has had mixed results, and he was unsuccessful in making many changes in how to handle Syria and North Korea.  Yes Obama did make some marginal changes, but fundamentally more continuity with Bush than a break.

The same is now true with Trump.   Candidate Trump disagreed with almost all things Obama.  The Iran nuclear deal would be torn up.  Trump pledged a Mexican wall, declare China a currency manipulator and impose tariffs on their products.  NATO was obsolete, the Syrian policy wrong, Putin and Russia a friend,  and global engagement must be retracted to put America first.  Great rhetoric, but the reality is tht slowly the forces that constrained Obama are constraining Trump.  

One now sees a new Trump.  The bombing of Syria, while a departure perhaps from what Obama did, is something that Hillary Clinton and most Republicans and Democrats in Congress support.  It produced a rift with Russia that now leads Trump to muse that perhaps our relations with that country are the worst ever (they are not).    Moreover, despite tough talk, trump’s options with Syria are limited, as they are throughout the Middle East.  Expect no major change in politics toward Egypt and Israel, and do not expect any major break in addressing the Palestinian quest for a homeland.

NATO is good, and China will not be declared a currency manipulator, and, in fact, if they help Trump to contain North Korea’s nuclear program, he will give them a great trade deal.  This statement is recognition that despite the show of force the US is demonstrating in sending ships to North Korea, there is little he can do along to change the politics in that country.  Gitmo will not be closed, the policy toward Cuba not reversed, and even the dropping of MOAB–the mother of all bombs–on Afghanistan–it was a policy in the works under the Obama administration.    Trump’s enhanced deportation policy and extreme vetting looks more and more like a variation of what Obama did–partly courtesy of the federal courts–and there will be no shift in the drone war

Nearly 90 days into the Trump presidency one can already seen more continuity with Obama than breaks.  Yes there are still rough edges, yes there appears to be no Trump grand strategy, but that lives a void to be filled by the bureaucracy and foreign policy establishment.  All this is exacerbated by the fact that Trump has not filled many key State and foreign policy positions, but that only means that the weight of the status quois filling the void.

The real sign of Donald Trump’s education or normalizing was the removal of Steve Bannon from the National Security Council.  Bannon saw the power of the bureaucracy and wanted to smash it.  Instead it smashed him and may soon lead to his ouster from the Trump administration in total.  That was a Trump presidency turning point.

It seemed just a few weeks ago people were talking of a failed Trump presidency, impeachment, or a major international crisis.   Yet increasingly likely is that an incompetent Trump will create the space for the bureaucracy to take over in the realm of foreign policy, for good or bad, and to the fear of delight of his supporters and detractors.

The Ethical Code of Dick Cheney

Please note:  This essay originally appeared in Politics in Minnesota.  Please consider subscribing to  that publication.

Has Dick Cheney ever expressed a moral qualm about anything he ever did? 
    If his comments about the Senate torture report released late last year are any indication, the simple answer is no.  Cheney’s life, both public and private, reveal a pattern of selfishness, devoid of any sense that he has ethically reflected on any of his actions or found any regret in his behavior.  He stands as the paradigm of a public official nearly devoid of a sense of personal integrity, demonstrating a sense of self-rationalization that stands as a negative example of what ethics in public office represents.
    There is a consensus among those who teach and write on government ethics that it includes a sense of personal integrity, reflection, consistency, respect for rule of law, attention to the reality and appearance of conflicts of interest, a shunning of self-dealing, respect for truth telling, and promoting the public good.  Applying these ethical benchmarks to Cheney, how does he measure up?
    Dick Cheney’s public career is long.  He served as a member of Congress, a presidential chief-of-staff, secretary of defense, and vice-president, in addition to being the CEO of Halliburton.  He has been described as one of the most powerful vice-presidents in history.  Yet almost from the start of his adult life Cheney had evidenced a selfish approach to the world, evincing no ethical maturation over time.  He is well-known for having dodged the draft and the Vietnam War with five deferments, proclaiming in a Washington Post interview that he “had other priorities in the 60's than military service."  This is the same person who as secretary of defense sent troops to Iraq in Operation Desert Storm and later to Afghanistan and Iraq again as part of the War on Terrorism.  Military service is a noble calling for Cheney; when it is others besides him who put their life on the line.  If the mark of integrity is consistency between what one says and does, hypocrisy is the badge of unethical behavior.  As philosopher Immanuel Kant once argued, a defining trait of unethical behavior is making yourself an exception to a rule you expect everyone else to follow.  This is what Cheney has done.
    Selflessly serving his country has never been an ethical priority for Cheney.  As CEO of Halliburton he did business with the US government that often amounted to gouging the taxpayer, with recurrent allegations that his company engaged in bribes to secure business.  When he gave up that post to become vice-president the New York Times reported that he may have lied about severing his ties with his former company.  It might well be that as VP he personally profited from decisions he made when Halliburton received government contracts.  Even if he did not, the appearance of conflict of interest was something  that he ignored.  Further proof of how he was inured to the appearance or reality of conflicts of interest was his hunting trip with Supreme Court Justice Scalia and how such activity might compromise the integrity of an impartial judicial system, especially at a time when the judiciary was adjudicating many Bush administration policies.
    When it comes to his conduct in government some might argue that Cheney is the consummate Machiavellian, echoing an “ends justifies the means” ethic. His comments about torture after the recent release of the Senate report that  “I would do it again in a minute” or that as he said on Meet the Press that “I’m more concerned with bad guys who got out and released than I am with a few that, in fact, were innocent” clearly demonstrate an ends justifies the means mentality.  But labeling Cheney a Machiavellian acting for a noble cause gives him too much moral credit.  First, his attitude in these statements expresses contempt for rule of law and human rights, something we expect of someone in a leadership position in a constitutional democracy.  Second, his statements reflect less an appeal to some public or greater good than they speak of post hoc rationalization of illegal behavior.
    Cheney is not really Machiavellian–he is simply partisan and self-interested.  In 2004 after Bush won re-election the vice-president spoke of tax cuts and spending priorities favoring his supporters by stating “We won the midterms (congressional elections). This is our due.”   Cheney is less interested in appeals to the greater good than his own personal interests or that of his friends. Don’t forget, Cheney too has expressed disdain for the importance of personal ethics in guiding government policy. Time once reported him saying about energy policy that: “Conservation may be a sign of personal virtue, but it is not a sufficient basis for a sound, comprehensive energy policy.”
    Respect for legality, patriotism, and honesty are generally hallmarks of ethical behavior. Yet Cheney’s chief of staff Scooter Libby was convicted of four counts of lying and obstruction of justice, and he and the vice-president are  tied to the outing of CIA agent Valerie Plame in retaliation for her husband and diplomat Joseph Wilson writing a New York Times op-ed sharply critical of the Bush Administration’s false claims of Iraq’s efforts to obtain nuclear materials.  It was such claims about Hussein possessing weapons of mass destruction that served as the pretext for the 2003 invasion.  Cheney continues to lie when it comes to Saddam Hussein, asserting in a 2014 Meet the Press interview that he "had a 10-year relationship with al-Qaida" even though all the evidence clearly refutes such a claim.
    Finally, some want to give Cheney credit for supporting same-sex marriage.  Yet such support may be less altruistic and principled than thought–perhaps based more on the fact that his daughter is a lesbian.  Therefore his views be less about ethics and more about personal or family self-interest.
    What do we learn about Dick Cheney’s ethics?  While his entire life has not been reviewed one can still learn a lot about his character based on choices he made in critical situations It is clear that by most standards regarding what would define someone as ethical, Cheney falls far short.  He is blind to conflicts of interest, real or apparent, is willing to lie for personal gain, and he is willing to make himself an exception to standards of conduct that most of us would expect others to follow.

The Lessons of Vietnam: Why Obama’s, McCain’s, and All the Other ISIS Plans will Fail

Listening to Obama’s speech Wednesday outlining his ISIS strategy was deja vu’ all over again.    It regurgitated the same failed strategy to deal with terrorism that Bush first gesticulated; but more importantly it uncomfortably demonstrated yet again the failed lessons of Vietnam that American leaders have yet to learn in the 40 years since that war ended.  His speech, along with the other plans proposed by the neo-cons and warmongers such as John McCain and Graham Lindsay, aptly confirmed one of the greatest lines by Karl Marx who stated once in his The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte: “Hegel remarks somewhere that all great world-historic facts and personages appear, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.”
    In a nutshell, Obama’s strategy is simple and simpleminded–America will drop tons of bombs on ISIS, expand the war to Syria, and rely upon ground troops provided by Iraq and other countries to replace Americans on the ground. It is a military strategy devoid of a political solution, emphasizing that it may take years (and into the next presidency) to succeed.  Obama inherited a failed war and is now passing it onto the next president.
    How much this reminds me of Vietnam, except not Obama is both Johnson and Nixon at the same time. President Johnson inherited a nascent war from Kennedy only to escalate it and then in  the waning year of his presidency to express remorse about its efficacy after the Tet Offense in 1968 where any confidence of US victory was destroyed by a massive North Vietnamese offense in January of that year.  The war cost Johnson a second term as president.  Nixon took over, again escalated it, including expanding the war illegally and secretly with bombings into Cambodia.  When  that did not work, Nixon’s peace plan was the “Vietnamization” of the war–replacing American ground troops with those of the South Vietnamese–hoping that the latter would be able to continue the war and delay America’s indignant and inevitable loss for a few years. 
    Obama’s expansion of the bombings and reliance upon Iraq or other ground troops is just Cambodia and Vietnamization warmed over.  But so was Bush’s response to 9-11, or to the invasion of Iraq in pursuit of the nonexistent weapons of mass destruction.  In all these cases the assumption was that American military might will overwhelm the enemy, liberating the people to form their own democratic societies.  It worked really well in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
    Alone the factual parallels to Vietnam should be instructive to why the Obama, McCain, et al plans will fail.  But dig deeper, there are two major lessons or reasons why any of the plans currently proposed are farces.  First, consider Powell Doctrine.  General Colin Powell in 1990 stated that the use of US military force needs to answer several questions, including asking whether there is a vital US interest at stake?  Are there clear objectives for the use of force?  Is there a clear definition of success?  And is there an exit strategy?  On all accounts, what Obama described in his Wednesday speech missed the mark.  About the only real rationale for going back to war is that we failed before  and that now we need to do more of the same to postpone failure even longer.  It is not clear what the US interest is, and even if there is one, we have no benchmarks for success or a strategy for leaving.  Quagmire was the word once used to describe Vietnam–that is the new word now for Iraq.
    But even more profoundly, the failure of Obama’s strategy lies in perhaps the most important lesson of Vietnam–the limits of US military power.  The single greatest book on Vietnam remains  Frances FitzGerald’s Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam.  In describing the failed war she describes of the US escalation into Vietnam:

    It was entering into a moral and ideological struggle over the form of the state and the goals of the society.  Its success with the chosen contender would depend not merely on US power but on the resources of both the United States and the Saigon government to solve Vietnamese domestic problems in a manner acceptable to the Vietnamese.  But what indeed were Vietnamese problems, and did they even exist in terms in which Americans conceived them?  The unknowns made the whole enterprise, from the most rational and tough-minded point of view, risky in the extreme.   (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972), 6-7.

The tragic failure of Vietnam was that it was really a battle for the hearts and minds of the people–not a war that could be one on the battlefield with bombs.  The US did understand that the problem of Vietnam was not a geopolitical one between communism and democracy, but a more indigenous cultural battle among the people there.  The same is true in Iraq and Syria.  This is not a global battle over terrorism and freedom but a problem that has to be solved by the people in that part of the world.  Dropping bombs does little to resolve the fight, especially if as in Vietnam it hurts  civilians and pushes them to the other side or continues to prevent people from solving their own problem.
    Missing from Obama’s and all the other plans is an asking of the question to why ISIS is so successful in recruiting supporters.  There is no plan to ascertaining why, for example, individuals from the Minnesota Somalian community are joining terrorist groups or why British citizens are becoming ISIS members who are beheading Americans.  Until such time as the focus shifts to asking these questions, to realizing that a strategy in place since Vietnam will not work, the current plans too will fail in farcical ways.

Law, Ethics, and Syria: What Should We Do?

Law matters.  But the law is the not sum total of what matters when it comes to asking the question “What is the right thing to do?,” be that in our personal or professional lives.  Often obedience to the law–asking if doing something is legal–is the starting point for evaluating conduct.  But there is a long lineage of people from St. Augustine, Henry David Thoreau, to Martin Luther King, Jr. Who would point out that unjust laws are not morally binding and that in some cases disobeying them is the right thing to do.  Conversely, mere conformity to the letter of the law also does not necessarily mean one is acting ethically or that following the rule is the right thing to do. More is required.  This is also true when it come to the decision by President Obama to take military action against Syria.

            Syria’s use of chemical weapons raises problems for the United States.  Specifically, any use of force raises three questions: 1) presidential authority to act; 2) what is distinct about Syria; and 3) what is the end game for the US?   All three of the questions have to be answered satisfactorily before the United States takes any action.

           

Presidential Authority to Act

            Obama wants congressional approval to use force, but he still had not ruled out doing something absent their acquiescence. What constitutional authority does President Obama have to justify military action in Syria? This is not clear.  Domestically, the two sources of legal authority he can reference would be either the Commander-in-Chief clause of Article II of the Constitution, or the 1973 War Powers Act.

            It is not clear how the Commander-in-Chief clause supports this action. The constitutional framers intended for Congress to be the dominant branch when it came to military and perhaps foreign affairs. Article I textually commits to Congress the power to declare war along with a host of other powers related to the military. Here Congress has not declared war and it is unlike after 9-11 when Congress did enact the Authorization to Use Military Force that gave Bush the authority (arguably) to deploy troops in Afghanistan. At least Bush had some legal authority to wage a war on terrorism, no matter how tenuous.

            If Obama is relying on his Commander-in-Chief powers, it is hard to see how they come in. Syria  has not attacked the US, it is not threatening vital interests, and it is not otherwise doing something that directly conflicts with American national security. Instead, to contend that the Commander-in-Chief clause gives Obama unilateral authority to deploy these troops is no different or better than Bush era assertions by advisors such as John Yoo and others that the president had inherent constitutional authority to act. He does not.

            There is no extra-constitutional authority for presidents to act. This was supposedly another issue or lesson learned from Vietnam; presidents should not unilaterally drag the country into war.  LBJ and then Nixon abused their presidential powers when it came to Vietnam.  Disputes over presidential power to deploy troops were supposedly addressed by the War Powers Act in 1973. It placed limits on presidential power to deploy troops for limited purposes, subject to consultation with and notification to Congress that the Act was being invoked. Here again Obama is not invoking the Act in asking Congress to approve.  However, overall, there seems little authority for the president to act here absent congressional approval.

What is distinct about Syria?

            But even if Congress does approve, the second problem is what is distinct about Syria? Assume for now that Obama has the constitutional authority to act. Why Syria and why not Kim Jong-Il in North Korea, Iran, Sudan, or Zimbabwe?  In all of these countries we have repressive dictators or regimes abusing the rights of their people.  Should the US use force in all of these countries to oust dictators?  If mere oppression were the justification for action the US would be busy around the world acting.  Moreover, if mere oppression were enough justification, the US should have ousted Assad years ago.  Something more is required.

            First at the international level is the authority to act.  Article II, section 7 of the United Nations Charter declares: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction.”  Is not what is happening in Syria a domestic matter and none of our business?  Maybe, but the legal case for it has to be made.  The UN allows for this under international law through resolutions and Security Council action.  With a Russian veto, chances for this type of authorization are nil.  Obama appears to want to justify intervention under international law that bans the use of chemical weapons or by invoking some other principles of humanitarianism, but again the justification is not obvious.

            But even if the United States can find justification under international law to act, there is still another question:  Why should the US act, potentially alone?  Again, Syria is less of a threat to the US than Iran and Korea. From a strategic point of view it is hard to justify intervention. Korea and Zimbabwe are equally as brutal regimes. Why not them? Perhaps the difference here is that there is a popular movement to oust him and that is the reason why we are acting? Maybe the issue is about prospects of success in ousting him? All of these are possible answers yet it is difficult to see a reason or argument that principally distinguishes Syria from acting in the other countries, unless of course it is the use of chemical weapons.  Similar reasons about weapons of mass destruction led Bush into Iraq and why the US is viewed as a hypocrite when it comes to the country supporting or placating some repressive regimes.

What is the End game?

            The final troubling issue is the end game for Obama. What are our goals and what are we really trying to accomplish? Is it  simply to punish Assad for using chemical weapons?  Is it because he has killed 50,000 of his people?  Do we hope that military action will oust him and if so, what are we prepared to do next?   What is the definition of success and what plans does the country have to exit from intervention?  These are all important questions that need to be asked.  Even if the US merely does drone strikes or other limited action, the US needs to be clear regarding what it hopes to accomplish and prepared for what might be the result?

            During the first Gulf War General Powell espoused a doctrine that has been named after him.  The Powell doctrine, supposedly based on what we learned from Vietnam, said that US military action needed to be evaluated by asking questions regarding clearly defining what national interests are at stake, whether the goals of intervention are clear, is there international support for action, what are the alternatives and risks to military action, and then determining what the end game and exit strategies are.  Using the Powell Doctrine to evaluate the comments by Secretary of State Kerry and Obama recently, it is not clear that they have adequately answered this question.

            What to do with Syria is a difficult question.  But it is a terrific case study in decision making and in demonstrating how questions about legality are only the starting point in determining what is the right thing to do.

Obama and Libya: The Authority to Act? (Plus a note on Pawlenty)

Muammar Gaddafi is an evil man who sponsored terrorism, suppressed, democracy, and has killed and tortured his people. I cheered when Libyans rose up against him. I supported the US and western embargo, the freezing of assets, and doing what we could to support the opposition. Gaddafi has to go.

But the same can be said of Kim Jong-Il in North Korea as well of Ahmadinejad in Iran, Mugabe in Zimbabwe, the leaders in China, and a host of other autocrats across the world. It would be terrific if they were swept aside by their people and democratic societies and governments replaced them. It wold also be wonderful if the US did all it could to encourage this–getting behind democracy and the people.

Yet the problem for the United States and Gaddafi is special–the U.S. has decided to use armed force to assist the opposition. This use of force raises three problems: 1) presidential authority to act; 2) what is distinct about Libya; and 3) what is the end game for the US?

Presidential Authority to Act

What constitutional authority does President Obama have to justify his deployment of American military force to enforce a no-fly zone in Libya? This is not clear.

The two sources of legal authority Obama can reference would be either the Commander-in-Chief clause of Article II of the Constitution, or the 1973 War Powers Act.

It is not clear how the Commander-in-Chief clause supports this action. The constitutional framers intended for Congress to be the dominant branch when it came to military and perhaps foreign affairs. Article I textually commits to Congress the power to declare war along with a host of other powers related to the military. Here Congress has not declared war and it is unlike after 9-11 when Congress did enact the Authorization to Use Military Force that gave Bush the authority (arguably) to deploy troops in Afghanistan. At least Bush had some legal authority to wage a war on terrorism, no matter how tenuous.

If Obama is relying on his Commander-in-Chief powers, it is hard to see how they come in. Libya has not attacked the US, it is not threatening vital interests, and it is not otherwise doing something that directly conflicts with American national security. Instead, to contend that the Commander-in-Chief clause gives Obama unilateral authority to deploy these troops is no different or better than Bush era assertions by John Yoo and others that the president had inherent constitutional authority to act. He does not.

There is no extra-constitutional authority for presidents to act. I discuss this issue in two articles. One is “ Democracy on Trial: Terrorism, Crime, and National Security Policy in a Post 9-11 World” that came out in Golden Gate Law Review and is located at http://works.bepress.com/david_schultz/15/ . The other is a piece entitled “Don’t Know Much About History: Constitutional Text, Practice, and Presidential Power,” http://works.bepress.com/david_schultz/11/ . This is a forthcoming piece is the University of St. Thomas Journal of Law and Public Policy.

Disputes over presidential power to deploy troops were supposedly addressed by the War Powers Act in 1973. It placed limits on presidential power to deploy troops for limited purposes, subject to consultation with and notification to Congress that the Act was being invoked. Here again Obama did not invoke the Act, although he does seem to reference it in terms of reporting to Congress. Had he actually invoked the Act, it might have provided clear support for his actions.

What Obama does seem to be invoking is Security Council Resolution 1973 that calls upon member states to enforce the no-fly zone. (Here is a link to his statement http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/21/letter-president-regarding-commencement-operations-libya ) However, UN resolutions are not self-executing in the US. They cannot create presidential constitutional authority when none already existed. The president still needs to get constitutional authority. Acting as he did seemed similar to what Bush did when he sought UN support to invade Iraq in search of the non-existent WMD.

What should Obama have done? For what seemed like two weeks he dithered over what to do as the rebels advanced and then were beaten back. He should have been consulting with Congress, getting their support to act if the UN authorized action, or he could have clearly invoked the War Powers Resolution. But in any case, he did nothing and then perhaps acted as Bush would–relying on some vague inherent presidential powers.

Overall, it is possible Obama had legal justification to act, it is just not clear what it is.

What is distinct about Libya?

The second problem is what is distinct about Libya? Assume for now that Obama has the constitutional authority to act. Why Libya and why not Kim Jong-Il in North Korea, Ahmadinejad in Iran or Mugabe in Zimbabwe? Perhaps one can argue that resolution 1973 makes the difference. Specifically, world opinion and international law provide legal authority to act here and that is the difference. This may be a good legal argument, but what about the real politick argument for the US?

Libya is less of a threat to the US than Iran and Korea. From a strategic point of view it is hard to justify intervention. Korea and Zimbabwe are equally as brutal regimes. Why not them? Perhaps the difference here is that there is a popular movement to oust him and that is the reason why we are acting? Maybe the issue is about prospects of success in ousting him? All of these are possible answers yet I have yet to see a reason or argument that principally distinguishes Libya from acting in the other countries. Such a failure to clarify is what led Bush into Iraq and why the US is viewed as a hypocrite when it comes to us supporting or placating some repressive regimes, including in the Arab world. Why for example, did we not act in Bahrain?

What is the End game?

The final troubling issue is the end game for Obama? What are our goals and what are we trying to accomplish? If it is simply to enforce the no-fly zone that already seems to have been secured. Do we now walk away or does that now require a constant presence? Is it to prevent Gaddafi from killing and abusing his people? If so then what more does it require? It is to take Gaddafi out? Military action in the last two days seem to suggest the later two options are possible goals?

It is just not clear what the end game is and what we hope to achieve. Given comments by SOS Clinton and Obama in the last week or so, ousting Gaddafi seems the real objective but there is nothing in Resolution 1973, in the power of the presidency, or in any statement by Obama that provides a clear definition of what our objectives are. For those of us growing up during Vietnam one of the major lessons was that there must be clear objectives surrounding US military action, and that seems absent here.

I would like Gaddafi out. I thought Obama waited too late to act. He needed to line up congressional support sooner when the Libyan opposition was stronger. He needed to show how the US could stand up for Arab people and not their dictators. He had a chance to take decisive action but he dithered. He waited so late that is probably costing more lives. That is the real tragedy of human suffering. But the other tragedy is constitutional and political–he has failed to show by what legal authority he is acting, why Libya, and what his end game is. All of this raises difficult questions for Obama and the United States.

A Note on Pawlenty


No surprise that Pawlenty is forming a presidential exploratory committee. We have known all along he wants to run for president. He needs to run because he has no other prospects for what to do.
But creating the committee still does not solve two fundamental problems Pawlenty has. First he has no narrative or voice that distinguishes him from all the other GOP candidates who may decide to run for president. He has failed so far to make the case for himself.

Second, Pawlenty seems to be running against everything. He is running against Obama, against taxes, and against federal health care. He tells us all the things he is against and will not do but he has failed to state what he will do as president. It is as if he is running against and not for the presidency. If he hates the government so much why does he want to be president? I am perplexed.

There is a reason he is so far down in the polls. He has no identity to call his own. After neatly two years unofficially running he is behind Michele Bachmann who has been an undeclared presidential candidate for about three months. He needs to catch fire quickly and hope for a good Iowa bounce. So far there is no indication that it will happen.