Trump, Brexit, and the Failure of Mainstream Politics and Economics

The Brexit vote and the rise of Donald Trump have stunned the world.  Neither should.  They

are both the product of the failures of mainstream politics and economics, especially the overselling of both in terms of how they would benefit the world and more specifically, the middle and working class in the UK, the US, and perhaps around the world.
The roots of the Brexit and Trump begin in what some call the Neo-liberal restructuring of the world that begin in the late 70s and 80s with the rise of Thatcher and Reagan.  Faced with severe economic slowdowns in the UK and the US, the criticism was that the economically liberal policies of the welfare state had created high inflation and unemployment–stagflation.  The solution was to cut taxes, economic regulation, and weaken labor unions.  The theory–part of the supply side economics mantra–was that we needed to free up corporations to invest, to give them more flexibility to innovate, and to remove barriers to invest.
The Conservatives in the UK under Thatcher and then  Major and the US under Reagan and George H.W. Bush cut taxes, government regulations, waged war on the unions, and embraced international policies that took Neo-liberalism globally.  The result was GATT, NAFTA, the WTO, and other international free trade agreements that opened up the borders to capital and to some extent, labor mobility.  Yet Labor under Tony Blair and the Democrats under Bill Clinton similarly  embraced such policies, as did Cameron, George Bush, and even Obama.  All of them accepted as legitimate globalization as we know it, along with policies that embraced tax cuts and deregulation.
Even Obama–whom many Americans think as so liberal–really fell into this trap.  Upon taking office in 2009 he continued the economic policies of his predecessor that bailed out the banks but not the home owners after the 2008 economic crash, he endorsed TPP as a trade agreement, and otherwise  at best only made marginal changes in the Neo-liberal economic agenda.  Even the Affordable Care Act and Dodd-Frank were no more than market-orientated approaches to addressing social-economic problems.  Yes, the Republicans in the US obstructed Obama, but he never did really oppose even in his first two years in office with large Democratic majorities the core trajectory of Neo-liberalism.
This Neo-liberalism was politically solid by politicians and the major parties in Europe and the US as economically a win-win for all.  It was described as producing the greatest economic good for all.  Mainstream economists–sitting from the luxury of their tenured chairs or luxurious offices a top Wall Street, described free trade, globalization, and economic restructuring as economically efficient–both in a Kaldor-Hicks way (the greatest good for the great number) and Pareto (producing the winners without any or significant losers).  The few jobs lost in manufacturing would more than be made of by the benefits of free trade.  Together, orthodox economics and the mainstream parties sold the world, or at least voters in the US and UK, a story of economic prosperity.
Yet it never happened.  Somewhere along the line the economic benefits did not trickle down.  Wages have stagnated over the last 40 years, the gap between the rich and poor exploded, and the loss of manufacturing and other jobs has totaled in the tens of millions. The working class has disproportionally taken the hit, with the costs of Neo-liberalism falling on them while few of the benefits reaching them.
Now combine that with another political failure–the Bush War on Terrorism, He and Blair  launched politically disruptive wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have destabilized the Middle East, creating the forces that have nurtured ISIS and the crisis in Syria that has now thrown millions of refugees across Europe. In the US, NAFTA helped destabilize the Mexican economy, creating the impetus for immigrants there to flee to the US for jobs.
The result is economic insecurity for many white working class, major parties largely blind to their fate, and a ready scapegoat of immigrants to blame.  Enter Brexit and Trump.
The Brexit vote is a statement that the status quo is not working.  The vote in the UK to exit was mostly in working class England.  In the US, the core of the Trump support was originally among white working class without college educations.  The same who supported Brexit, those who have lost out in the last generation or two  who perceive it is the immigrants who are taking their jobs.    The British Independence Party, Donald Trump, and others such as LaPen in France are appealing to economic insecurities, fear of immigrants, nationalism, and simply racism and religion.  And their appeals are effective.  Brexit gives credence to claims that trump has tapped into a phenomena that might put him in the White House.  Hillary Clinton, while enjoying many political advantages, seems largely clueless to the Neo-liberal paradigm of which she is a part.
Yes, all of this is disgusting, but given the failures of mainstream politics and economics to address or recognize the world it has created, the reaction here should not be a surprise.

Obama and Libya: The Authority to Act? (Plus a note on Pawlenty)

Muammar Gaddafi is an evil man who sponsored terrorism, suppressed, democracy, and has killed and tortured his people. I cheered when Libyans rose up against him. I supported the US and western embargo, the freezing of assets, and doing what we could to support the opposition. Gaddafi has to go.

But the same can be said of Kim Jong-Il in North Korea as well of Ahmadinejad in Iran, Mugabe in Zimbabwe, the leaders in China, and a host of other autocrats across the world. It would be terrific if they were swept aside by their people and democratic societies and governments replaced them. It wold also be wonderful if the US did all it could to encourage this–getting behind democracy and the people.

Yet the problem for the United States and Gaddafi is special–the U.S. has decided to use armed force to assist the opposition. This use of force raises three problems: 1) presidential authority to act; 2) what is distinct about Libya; and 3) what is the end game for the US?

Presidential Authority to Act

What constitutional authority does President Obama have to justify his deployment of American military force to enforce a no-fly zone in Libya? This is not clear.

The two sources of legal authority Obama can reference would be either the Commander-in-Chief clause of Article II of the Constitution, or the 1973 War Powers Act.

It is not clear how the Commander-in-Chief clause supports this action. The constitutional framers intended for Congress to be the dominant branch when it came to military and perhaps foreign affairs. Article I textually commits to Congress the power to declare war along with a host of other powers related to the military. Here Congress has not declared war and it is unlike after 9-11 when Congress did enact the Authorization to Use Military Force that gave Bush the authority (arguably) to deploy troops in Afghanistan. At least Bush had some legal authority to wage a war on terrorism, no matter how tenuous.

If Obama is relying on his Commander-in-Chief powers, it is hard to see how they come in. Libya has not attacked the US, it is not threatening vital interests, and it is not otherwise doing something that directly conflicts with American national security. Instead, to contend that the Commander-in-Chief clause gives Obama unilateral authority to deploy these troops is no different or better than Bush era assertions by John Yoo and others that the president had inherent constitutional authority to act. He does not.

There is no extra-constitutional authority for presidents to act. I discuss this issue in two articles. One is “ Democracy on Trial: Terrorism, Crime, and National Security Policy in a Post 9-11 World” that came out in Golden Gate Law Review and is located at http://works.bepress.com/david_schultz/15/ . The other is a piece entitled “Don’t Know Much About History: Constitutional Text, Practice, and Presidential Power,” http://works.bepress.com/david_schultz/11/ . This is a forthcoming piece is the University of St. Thomas Journal of Law and Public Policy.

Disputes over presidential power to deploy troops were supposedly addressed by the War Powers Act in 1973. It placed limits on presidential power to deploy troops for limited purposes, subject to consultation with and notification to Congress that the Act was being invoked. Here again Obama did not invoke the Act, although he does seem to reference it in terms of reporting to Congress. Had he actually invoked the Act, it might have provided clear support for his actions.

What Obama does seem to be invoking is Security Council Resolution 1973 that calls upon member states to enforce the no-fly zone. (Here is a link to his statement http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/21/letter-president-regarding-commencement-operations-libya ) However, UN resolutions are not self-executing in the US. They cannot create presidential constitutional authority when none already existed. The president still needs to get constitutional authority. Acting as he did seemed similar to what Bush did when he sought UN support to invade Iraq in search of the non-existent WMD.

What should Obama have done? For what seemed like two weeks he dithered over what to do as the rebels advanced and then were beaten back. He should have been consulting with Congress, getting their support to act if the UN authorized action, or he could have clearly invoked the War Powers Resolution. But in any case, he did nothing and then perhaps acted as Bush would–relying on some vague inherent presidential powers.

Overall, it is possible Obama had legal justification to act, it is just not clear what it is.

What is distinct about Libya?

The second problem is what is distinct about Libya? Assume for now that Obama has the constitutional authority to act. Why Libya and why not Kim Jong-Il in North Korea, Ahmadinejad in Iran or Mugabe in Zimbabwe? Perhaps one can argue that resolution 1973 makes the difference. Specifically, world opinion and international law provide legal authority to act here and that is the difference. This may be a good legal argument, but what about the real politick argument for the US?

Libya is less of a threat to the US than Iran and Korea. From a strategic point of view it is hard to justify intervention. Korea and Zimbabwe are equally as brutal regimes. Why not them? Perhaps the difference here is that there is a popular movement to oust him and that is the reason why we are acting? Maybe the issue is about prospects of success in ousting him? All of these are possible answers yet I have yet to see a reason or argument that principally distinguishes Libya from acting in the other countries. Such a failure to clarify is what led Bush into Iraq and why the US is viewed as a hypocrite when it comes to us supporting or placating some repressive regimes, including in the Arab world. Why for example, did we not act in Bahrain?

What is the End game?

The final troubling issue is the end game for Obama? What are our goals and what are we trying to accomplish? If it is simply to enforce the no-fly zone that already seems to have been secured. Do we now walk away or does that now require a constant presence? Is it to prevent Gaddafi from killing and abusing his people? If so then what more does it require? It is to take Gaddafi out? Military action in the last two days seem to suggest the later two options are possible goals?

It is just not clear what the end game is and what we hope to achieve. Given comments by SOS Clinton and Obama in the last week or so, ousting Gaddafi seems the real objective but there is nothing in Resolution 1973, in the power of the presidency, or in any statement by Obama that provides a clear definition of what our objectives are. For those of us growing up during Vietnam one of the major lessons was that there must be clear objectives surrounding US military action, and that seems absent here.

I would like Gaddafi out. I thought Obama waited too late to act. He needed to line up congressional support sooner when the Libyan opposition was stronger. He needed to show how the US could stand up for Arab people and not their dictators. He had a chance to take decisive action but he dithered. He waited so late that is probably costing more lives. That is the real tragedy of human suffering. But the other tragedy is constitutional and political–he has failed to show by what legal authority he is acting, why Libya, and what his end game is. All of this raises difficult questions for Obama and the United States.

A Note on Pawlenty


No surprise that Pawlenty is forming a presidential exploratory committee. We have known all along he wants to run for president. He needs to run because he has no other prospects for what to do.
But creating the committee still does not solve two fundamental problems Pawlenty has. First he has no narrative or voice that distinguishes him from all the other GOP candidates who may decide to run for president. He has failed so far to make the case for himself.

Second, Pawlenty seems to be running against everything. He is running against Obama, against taxes, and against federal health care. He tells us all the things he is against and will not do but he has failed to state what he will do as president. It is as if he is running against and not for the presidency. If he hates the government so much why does he want to be president? I am perplexed.

There is a reason he is so far down in the polls. He has no identity to call his own. After neatly two years unofficially running he is behind Michele Bachmann who has been an undeclared presidential candidate for about three months. He needs to catch fire quickly and hope for a good Iowa bounce. So far there is no indication that it will happen.

Explaining Election 2010 Part I: Obama's Errors

Why did the Democrats lose on Tuesday? Explanations will range from the election being a referendum on Obama, Obamacare, and perhaps the economy. Pundits and politicians–both Democratic and Republican–will contend that Obama strayed too far to the left, now forcing him and his party to the right as they prepare for 2012.

Yet this explanation and strategy fails to capture the full scope of the errors committed by the Democrats. What were those errors? Simply put, he ignored the basic rules of politics that he appeared to understand so well in 2008.

The Narrative. At its most basic, politics is the power of a compelling narrative. It is a story that describes who you are and what you want to accomplish. The Democratic narrative for 2008 was simple–“Change.” Obama and the Democrats promised change, and that drove them to power. But they lacked a good narrative this year.

In a year where the economy still stunk, how did Obama defend his stimulus bill, financial reform, and health care changes? The narrative was simple: “It could have been worse (had we not acted).” Such a narrative hardly inspires voters or wins over swing voters, but that was their narrative. For the Republicans, their narrative was also simple–“change.” They appropriated the Democratic narrative and used it against them.

Leadership. Obama demonstrated a striking lack of leadership. He wanted health care and financial reform but he delegated the tasks to Congress. The same was true with global warming and other issues. Yet Obama failed to take ownership for the legislation, letting others drive the agenda, producing changes that were more pork than policy.

Timidity. Obama and the Democrats promised a lot, but delivered very little. They passed stimulus bills and financial reform, but their scope was muted. They were not bold but cropped, failing to really address the depth of economic and financial reforms that plagued the nation. Similarly, he proposed closing Gitmo and ending the war in Iraq. Neither really occurred. He did little to pressure Israel for peace. In many ways, the Obama Administration coopted itself into being less bold than it needed to be to effect change.

Siding with the banks. Consistently Obama got it wrong on the economy. He continued Bush’s TARP policy to bail out the banks. He again sided with them on foreclosure. He did not press them far enough on bonuses. Consistently he threw away the Democrat economic populist advantage. He looked to many that he favored banks over homeowners and workers.
Party Discipline. Can you imagine Lyndon Johnson pleading with a Ben Nelson to vote for financial reform? Obama could not even get his own party behind him to support policies he wanted.

Republicans. From day one the Republicans sought to sabotage Obama and the Democrats. Foolishly he tried to placate Republicans even though the latter were not bargaining in good faith. One or two tries to bargain with them should have demonstrated this futility.

Define or be defined. John Kerry is the poster child for swiftboating. Politics is about defining yourself and the opponent or be defined. Obama let himself and his policies get defined–such as Obamacare–and he never recovered from that, forcing Democrats into a defensive posture.

Rewarding friends. Winning campaigns is about building coalitions. It is also about rewarding supporters. To build a lasting coalition one has to reward supporters. Obama forgot this. Unions worked hard for him in '08 but he told them to wait on The Employee Free Choice Act. Gays and Lesbians wanted him to repeal “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” but he also told them to wait. The middle class wanted jobs and economic help, he assisted the banks instead. At almost every critical point Obama alienated supporters by telling them to wait. As a result they abandoned him on Tuesday.

Modifying the Filibuster. Democrats had 60 votes in the Senate but acted like they were powerless. The filibuster rule meant Obama’s agenda was held hostage to the likes of Ben Nelson and Mary Landrieu. The first act of the Senate should have been to repeal this rule.

All politics is national. Tip O’Neill once said all politics is local. Actually it is the reverse. National issues now drive local politics. This happened across the 50 states as local elections became referenda on Obama. Democrats in local races in 2006 and 2008 ran against Bush, this time Republicans did the same by running against Obama.

The roots of the Democratic demise go back to day one with Obama. There are many things he should have done differently but mostly it was to forget the basic rules of politics in 2010 that he appeared to understand so well in 2008.

Change

Oh yea,
Mm,
Still don’t know what I am waiting for,
and my time was running wild,
a million dead-end streets and
Every time I’d thought I got it made
it seemed the taste was not so sweet
–Changes, David Bowie

Change. Four years ago voters demanded it and they ousted the Republicans from Congress. Two years ago they demanded it and pushed Obama into office along with huge congressional majorities. Now change may do Democrats in, producing a GOP House and perhaps, but less likely, a Senate.

What is certain is that whatever voters do this fall, change will not be the result. If Democrats retain control of both houses of Congress it will be by the narrowest of margins, guaranteeing gridlock for two more years. The same is true whether the GOP takes both houses or the parties split. The voters will get more of the status quo. The desire for change will produce its opposite. How Orwellian.

But what is change and what do voters want? These two questions have always perplexed me. When I teach my undergraduate Intro to American Politics class I often begin the class with a discourse on change. I point out first that there is a perennial demand for change among the American electorate along with an equally perennial frustration that change did not occur. I then point out that a defining characteristic of American politics was how the constitutional framers designed a political system that was meant to frustrate and slow down political change.

Checks and balances, separation of powers, federalism, bicameralism, and staggered elections were all designed to break up political power and slow down political change. As James Madison pointed out in Federalist 10, the main threat to popular government was the danger of majority faction–the tyranny of the majority for Alexis deTocqueville. The best thing about a popular government is rule by public opinion, the worst is the same. Madison and the framers sought a system to slow down political change to frustrate the ability of the majority to trample on the rights of the minority. For good or bad, change is meant to be slow or incremental. This is the reality of American politics by design. Americans who do not realize this are frustrated because of logic of our political process.

But institutional design has been compounded by other problems. For example, in the Senate the filibuster makes it impossible to get work done, allowing 41 senators who could represent less than 11% of the population to halt change. One of the biggest mistakes Democrats made in 2009 when they had 60 votes was not to abolish the filibuster rule. Instead, they let themselves be held hostage to Ben Nelson, Blanch Lincoln, and other Democrats who are barely in tune with their party. Thus, lack of party discipline also hampered the Democrats during the Obama years.

Additionally, Obama’s lack of leadership–a failure to take control of the agenda and cede it to Congress–was a major problem. Can anyone ever imagine a Lyndon Johnson letting a Ben Nelson toy with his party over whether to vote for health care reform? Conversely, what has really struck me about Obama is the timidity of change. He has done so little with so much promise. Yes a health care bill but mediocre. Yes financial reform, but mediocre. Yes a stimulus, but mediocre. He has delivered on major promises but the scale of change or reform was quite minor.

But finally, the problem of change resides with the voters. What do they really mean or want when they say change? Real change is what happened when in the early 1990s people walked out of their houses in Eastern Europe and brought down the Berlin Wall. Or in South Africa when they ended apartheid. I doubt that is what American voters want.

Change in the last few years might have been "out with George Bush." End the wars, end the squabble in Washington, or something else. I just do not know. Change seems more negative than positive–voters know they do not like the status quo but do not know what they want. They want something to change for the better but seem blind to what it is they want. Moreover, voters are not of one mind. For those who are angry and demand change this year, are they the same ones who wanted it two years ago? Maybe yes, but the American electorate is so fragmented that there is no real consensus on what change is supposed to be.

“Still don’t know what I am waiting for.”

A Tale of Two People: Tom Emmer and John Yoo

Media depictions of personalities often contrast with reality. While in some cases the camera or microphone (or now YouTube) capture who we are, often there is a contrast between our real being and how we are presented. This dichotomy came home to me recently as I thought about two individuals who I know personally–Tom Emmer and now John Yoo.

I remember in 1992 while teaching in Texas Bill Clinton had won the primaries and would be the Democratic presidential candidate. He had yet to pick a VP. My university president called me one day and asked if I would mind opening up my class to a U.S. senator who was doing a book tour and he wanted to visit a couple of political science classes. I agreed and we combined two or three classes together to create a room of about 65 students.

For the next 90 minutes the senator captivated me and students. He was engaging, funny, witting, and demonstrated a brilliance and grasp of policy issues I seldom see among elected officials. I also shook his hand, had him autograph his book. Overall, he was one of the nicest and most compelling people I had ever met. I went home, told my wife about him and said Clinton should make him VP. Clinton did that. The senator was Al Gore.

But the Gore I saw in class that day was the not same Al Gore I saw on television and as vice-president. As VP, and then presidential candidate, he was wooden, stiff, and generally failed to demonstrate any of the charm I knew he had. I often wondered and asked: “Will the real Al Gore please stand up.” There were two Gores I saw–one up close and personal–the other through the eyes of the media, and reconciling them was difficult.

I tell the Gore story because it reminds me of my personal experiences with two other people in the news.

Tom Emmer
Tom Emmer is the Republican nominee for Minnesota Governor. I will skip all the media depictions of him. Instead me let describe how I know him.

When he first got elected to the Minnesota House of Representatives he called me. I had no idea who he was and he was just starting off his political career. He wanted to meet. He told me he was interested in campaign finance reform and concerned about money in politics. He told me a story. He said he had been at some event where the conservative pro-life Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life (MCCL) had said something to the effect that they had the votes of a whole bunch of legislators because of all of the money that had been raised or channeled to candidates. Emmer told me: “I may vote with the MCCL, but I do not like the idea that they think they can buy me with their money.” Tom was sincere, he wanted to do something about cutting off money in politics. He was told I was a past president for Common Cause and had consistently testified for Senator John Marty and others seeking to limit the role of money in politics.

Emmer asked me if I had any ideas for bills. I gave him my wish list. It included a state version of McCain-Feingold, limits on contributions to political parties, new disclosure laws, and more. Tom introduced all of the legislation. Against the wishes of the Republican majority that controlled the House and the MCCL he pushed for the bills. He fought DFL resistence too. The bills did not pass, but for at least two years he fought hard and I testified for him. His bills got farther on campaign finance than any others in Minnesota since 1994.

I have no idea where Emmer stands today on campaign finance. However, then I never doubted his sincerity on the issue.

Emmer and I stand opposite on other issues. He once supported a bill that would require the public positing of names of state judges who issue judicial bypasses for minors seeking abortions. I testified against the bill arguing that it would damage the judiciary. We also testify on opposite sides of voter photo identification bills. I mention all this because I have come to know Emmer as a person. In all the times we have worked together or opposite one another he has treated me with respect and I see something in him that does not come out in the media.

John Yoo
John Yoo is famous for being the Bush Administration attorney who penned the legal opinions for the War on Terror. He authored the critical opinions that supported presidential power detain prisoners at Gitmo without trial and to torture. In the media, he is attributed with drafting the “torture memos.”

In my own writings, including a paper at Oxford University and two scholarly articles, I criticized Yoo. He has been hammered in the media, subject to demands to prosecute for war crimes, and investigated for legal ethics violations. He is picketed where ever he speaks. He must be a monster!

I met Yoo this past Thursday at the University of St Thomas Law School. We were both invited along with others to speak and give papers at a University of St. Thomas Journal of Law and Public Policy conference on presidential war powers. The journal and conference are student operated and they did a great job on Thursday. I was privileged to be on the panel with great names. The conference was loaded with conservatives and I was the token.

There were demonstrators present in and outside. Collen Rowley, a former FBI agent featured on the 2002 Time magazine, was there to protest. Security was tight.

John and I spoke a lot that day and had lunch together. We did disagree on topics, but we also shared observations. His talk on George Washington and presidential power was terrific even if I disagreed. Finally at the end of the day we talked baseball–he a Philly fan me a Yankee–and we discussed the prospects of a 2010 repeat of the 2009 World Series.

I walked away from the day thinking how nice Yoo as a person was. I cannot explain how or why he came to his conclusions in 2002 about presidential war powers, and I will not discuss why I think his arguments were flawed. I will simply say that for the day I met him I saw someone different than I had previously read about or saw from a distance.

Thoughts on the MN Primary: Looking to the General Election

What did we learn about the August 10, MN primary? A few interesting things.

Turnout
First, I confess, I was wrong. I predicted an August primary would produce a 12% turnout or a 2% decease from previous years. Instead, it went up to 15%. I am glad I was wrong. Instead of people being confused by a new date perhaps candidate groundwars and the novelty of the new date increased turnout.

Second, because of increased turnout, the winning number for the DFL primary was much higher than I predicted. Moreover, given how many voted in the DFL primary, this suggests more passion or hunger by the DFL to win the governorship. This is why the primary turnout increased, and it does give Dayton some momentum heading into November.

Why Dayton?
Many DFLers expressed shock that Kelliher lost. I never thought she would. All along I said that Dayton had the name recognition advantage, the money advantage (over Kelliher but not Dayton), and was at least second in terms of ties to organized interests (AFSCME) in terms of organized interests. All this counted a lot. But I also suggested his strength would be with the Iron Range and his Lt. Governor. This is what paid off. Kelliher was really an urban Twin Cities candidate but never really one with broader appeal across the state.

I also think there was a certain arrogance on display with the DFL establishment on Tuesday. As I listened to MPR on Tuesday night Brian Melendez and others in the DFL seemed self-confident and cocky that their machine would deliver for Kelliher. Why believe that when the track record for the last two decades demonstrates the contrary. I think Kelliher’s shock and late concession on Wednesday reflected this arrogance too. Neither she nor the rank DFL get it in terms of understanding that they do not speak or represent the broader spectrum of those who consider themselves Democrats.

What is significant about Dayton are two things. First, he won with rural and blue collar support. The GOP should be worried about this. Generally, Emmer and the GOP can count on rural votes and some blue collar. However, Dayton ran strong where the GOP normally do. Assuming that the DFLers can bring their organization statewide and in the metro region to support Dayton, the DFL has a good campaign.

Second, Dayton won with a coalition and themes that bring back to life the old Perpich era. He did well with workers and the Iron Range and he ran on populist themes that harken back to that era. His emphasis on education returns the DFL to the Perpich one of making MN the brainpower state. Normally I do not think the past beats the future in politics, but here Dayton is cementing together one last time the old Perpich themes and coalition and updating for 2010. It might work again.

The General Election
It is trite to say that Dayton versus Emmer represents the broadest liberal/conservative divide in decades and that this sets up Horner for the center. All this is true. This also sets up the old Perpich coalition v. the new Tea Party brand of the GOP. Two different populist movements in conflict.

Emmer faces some weaknesses. Support for him among his base is a little soft, leaving Horner with room to grab GOPers. Also, Dayton has a stronger hold on moderate swing voters and female suburban voters (the soccer moms) than does Emmer. This is the battleground and Emmer is way behind here. He needs to figure out a way to remessage and move to the center. However, thanks to Matt Entenza and bad campaigning on his own account, the DFL has already defined Emmer. Emmer made the same mistake as Kerry in '04–he let others define him instead of defining himself. Once defined it is hard to undue.

Emmer also faces a McCain problem. In '08 McCain knew Bush was unpopular and that “change” was the mantra of the year. He needed to figure out how to run against Bush, a member of his own party, and also recognize that America was going in the wrong direction. If you are of the same party how can change mean staying with the same party? This is a tough trick to perform and McCain failed.

Emmer has a similar problem. He says MN is on the wrong track and it needs a new direction on taxes and regulation. He seems to forget that Pawlenty was governor for the last 8 years. How can he run against is own party? This is the McCain-Bush problem repeated here. Yes, Emmer represents a different wing of the GOP compared to Pawlenty (it is the Reagan v. Palin wing), but the DFL have already linked Emmer to Pawlenty.

Finally, the issues. Briefly, it is the economy and jobs. Average voters do not care about the record of Dayton as senator or the budget deficit. If the GOP talk about Dayton’s senate life that get away from core issues of the economy. Conversely, if the DFL talk too much about DWI and the deficit that also lose focus.