The Declining Significance of Race in America, Not Quite

 This blog  originally appeared in Counterpunch. 

            According to a recent study on economic mobility in the United States, race appears to be a declining factor in terms of explaining intergenerational mobility. For some the conclusion might be that race matters less in America. But the reality is less that race doesn't matter and more that class has become even more of a significant variable or factor in American politics.

            Researchers at the Harvard University’s Opportunity Insights Center tracked intergenerational mobility by race and class. What they found was that between 1978 and 1992 children from high income families saw their incomes increase, while children from low income families decreased by 30%.  At the same time income earnings for parental income of Black children at all levels increased.  This reduced the Black-White income gap across the board by 30%.

            On the face of it, this study would seem to suggest that the gap between Black and White children  has decreased , thereby mitigating or rendering race a less important factor in America. Yet race still does matter. What has happened in recent American history are a couple of things.  One is that for poor White children, their mobility has decreased, leveled down to that perhaps that for Blacks.   Two, instead of economic mobility increasing overall, it is decreasing.  

            This study suggests class has become even more important than it was before. The evidence from this study documents an increased rigidity whereby now both Blacks and Whites at lower income levels have less mobility to move up now than before.  The study also  indicates that factors such as parental income and neighborhood are even more determinative of social mobility and life outcomes than before. At no point does this study indicate that race is no longer important.  Instead, there has been a leveling down in a sense that class now holds down or holds back Whites at lower income levels, at rates that are approximating those for African Americans.  Therefore at lower income levels, both Blacks and Whites face increasingly convergent impediments to social mobility.

            What does all this mean? Race and class continue to hold back many in America.  Repeated studies point to significant racial disparities in income, wealth, home ownership, criminal justice, education, and voter participation.  Many of these are solely issues of race, but they too intersect with economics and class. To be from a lower socio-economic class, regardless of race, impose impediments on social mobility, and those class barriers are only increasing.

            When we think about the 2024 presidential and other elections, neither the Democrats nor the Republicans are seriously talking about class, nor how its intersection with race impacts social mobility in America. Despite Trump's appeal to the working class, he offers nothing to help them beyond appeals to anger and racism, Harris's proposals acknowledge race and identity, but offer little to address the root causes of intergenerational poverty.

            The dirty secret of American politics is that both race and class do matter. They come together to undermine the very concept of the American dream and the now mythic belief that by merit and hard work, individuals can get ahead.  If it was not the case. already, American society has become more rigid and stratified, with little evidence that it is going to change in the future, regardless of the party or president elected this November.

MAD to NUTS: US Nuclear Strategy, Donald Trump, and North Korea

Asking are we on the brink of war with North Korea is the question of the day.  For many the fear is that we have two leaders–Kim Jong-Un and Donald Trump–who are  hotheads, willing to engage in public threats and not private diplomacy.  They look like two drunks in a bar at 2:00 a.m., standing chest-to-chest with one another, neither really wants a fight but neither can back down, and the conditions are ripe for the confrontation to tip out of control.  Yet the conditions for why this confrontation are so unstable reside in the evolution of US nuclear strategy which has gone from MAD to NUTS, and because so many of the conditions that actually mad the Cold War stable are not present here.

The stability of US nuclear strategy during the Cold War was MAD–mutual assured destruction. In a bipolar world divided up between the USSR and the USA, part of what kept either country from using nuclear weapons and going to war was that both countries would face certain  destruction.  Neither country would be able to prevail over the other without also suffering significant damage.  Fear of mutual assured destruction prevented nuclear war.  But the stability of the Cold War also was premised on several other factors.

First, neither country seriously questioned the regime legitimacy of the other nor that it genuinely contested each other’s core spheres of influence.  Yes there were surrogate battles across the world such as the Congo or Vietnam, but both he USA and USSR generally acknowledged the security interests of one another and did not try to cross it.  The one major instance where that line was breached was the Cuban Missile Crisis, nearly resulting in a major war.

Second, in part as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the USSR and USA developed communication strategies to stay in contact.  The Hot line in one famous example.  The point is that the two countries talked to one another, they had ways to try to resolve conflicts through diplomacy.  Without talking to one another, the USSR and USA would have been locked in the classic prisoners’ dilemma where acting alone there was incentive to confess (go to war) instead of remaining silent  (Maintaining peace).  While the Cold War era was scary, MAD worked and it prevented nuclear war.

Yet beginning in the 1980s and especially into the post-Cold War era US nuclear strategy went NUTS--Nuclear utilization target selection.    NUTS was about the idea that the US had the capabilities to engage in limited nuclear war.  It could do so because of the precision of our missiles, the overwhelming force the country had, or the defenses that it had to repel an enemy attack.  In addition, as a result of the demise of the USSR, the USA as the “winner” of the Cold War felt that it potentially could make limited nuclear war just another option among others in its military menu because it did not face the threats of mutually assured destruction.  In effect, the USA could win a  limited nuclear war.

What successfully prevented nuclear war during the Cold War is missing from the confrontation with North Korea.  MAD is missing.  The US will win a nuclear or any type of confrontation with North Korea, and that alone is destabilizing because it creates incentives to take a chance and escalate a shouting match into a military confrontation.  In the case of Trump, he may be convinced we win a limited nuclear battle if it escalates to that, or that because of his apparent indifference to our third parties, a battle that inflicts damages to Japan or South Korea is acceptable.  In effect, a false or genuine belief that the USA will not face assured destruction is destabilizing,  thus moving North Korea from MAD to NUTS.

In addition, it does not help that in the last few days Trump and his Secretary of Defense have threatened the legitimacy or existence of the North Korean regime.  This too is destabilizing, but it also fits into North Korea’s game plan.  That country is an oppressive totalitarian state whose legitimacy in the eyes of its people resides in constantly stirring up fears that its very existence is under threat from outside forces such as the USA.  This appeal to fear makes it possible to extract the sacrifices the regime gets from its people.  The more Trump responds to blusters with blusters, the more it both feeds into the ability of North Korea to maintain a tight gripe on its people but also  it fuels insecurities about regime existence that can escalate into conflict.

Finally, unlike during the Cold War era, there is little in terms of back door communication channels to prevent the prisoners’ dilemma miscalculation.   Many of the statements from North Korea are blusters directed more for internal than external purposes and historically have been dismissed as such.  Yet now Kim Jong-Un’s rhetoric may be backing him and Trump into corners they cannot escape.  Neither Trump not Kim may know how far to go before their words get away from them.  In an era now (as opposed to even a year or so ago) where the two nations must deal with one another as nuclear powers, it is simply not clear how past behavior controls or directs the current conflict.

Overall, Kim and Trump may be hotheads but they face a context far different from the Cold War or from what has defined North Korean-US relations for 70 years.  It is the uncertainty of this new context that is what makes this situation so dangerous.

Final note:  Take a look at this blog of mine from last year--a work of political fiction involving Trump, North Korea, and nuclear weapons.