Why did the Minnesota Legislative Special session fail to produce police reform, a bonding bill,
a Covid-19 bill, and more? That is the wrong question to ask. Instead of the surprise of why it was a failed session one should ask was there any chance it would succeed? The answer is no, and the reasons it failed will be the same for a future Special Session later this year if called.
The first reason for failure was that the regular session set the grounds for the failure of the special session. Consider where the Minnesota politics was when the regular legislative session ended in May. Politically the legislature and the governor were divided. With the only state in the country with partisan control of the legislature split, Democrats and Republicans were fissured here along lines that mirrored national divisions. There was a clear divide geographically in the state between urban, suburban, and rural that reinforced the partisan-ideological differences.
In Minnesota, the Republican Senate and DFL House were divided over the governor’s use of peacetime emergency powers to close part of the economy. This division spilled into other issues, such as over the amount of the bonding bill and whether Republicans would provide the critical votes for it. Some of these disagreements were substantive policy differences, some tactical, some part of the way the 2020 elections were an overlay or backdrop to the session. Better, according to some, not to negotiate and pass legislation and instead use the issues to run on this November than reach a boring compromise. This is where the legislative session ended on May 18. The politics of the regular session simply carried over into the special session.
Initially there were two major reasons why the governor wanted or had to call a special session. One was to get the bonding bill passed to help stimulate the economy. Two, Governor Walz had to convene a special session no later than June 12, according to state law, if he planned to extend his peacetime emergency orders another 30 days. He had to do that to give the Legislature a chance to override his orders.
Two, between then and June 10, when the governor called the special session, or June 12, when it started, nothing and everything changed. Nothing changed in that neither the governor nor the legislative leadership of both parties did much to change the incentive structures or politics of the regular session from impacting the special session. Between May 18, and June 10, it does not appear that there were any negotiations among the leadership to reach compromises or deals. That needed to occur.
Going back at two generations to when Rudy Perpich was governor there was a basic political rule that one does not call a special session until all the details for it are worked out. Only governor’s can call special sessions but once the legislature is back, legislators decide what will be discussed and when to adjourn. To address the specter of aimless, unproductive special sessions the rule was negotiate in advance, get agreement on major issues and targets if not even the actual legislation before calling starting a special session. This did not happen here.
There was no agreement on the scope or dollar amount of the bonding bill. There was partisan disagreement over the governor’s authority to respond to the pandemic. None of this had been resolved. Lacking negotiations and agreement going into the special session why anyone would have thought it would have produced a different result that the regular session is naive.
But everything did change since the end of the regular session–George Floyd’s death, the demonstrations, the destruction, and the demand for police reform. When the governor on June 10, called for a special session he sent confusing messages. It was now about police reform. Yet police reform as a salient political issue decreases in importance in Minnesota the farther one gets away from Minneapolis and Saint Paul. For Twin Cities legislators and their constituents it is a major issue, not so much for those at the four corners of the state and in greater Minnesota. However unjust and wrong the killing of George Floyd was and however racist policing may or may not be, protests and anger in Minneapolis and Saint Paul were not going to change much the political calculus on police reform outside of those two cities. Not understanding this was another reason why the special session was destined to fail.
But the special session failed also because of confusion over its purpose. It was now about police reform but also about the bonding bill, other unfinished business, and to extend his peacetime emergency orders. There was too much to do, with too little focus and preparation for all of this in a promptly called special session when little had been done to prepare for it. This confusion and lack of preparation are other reasons why the special session failed.
Finally, the special session was almost a month later than the end of the regular session. It was one month closer to the November elections; one month closer to being firmly captured by politics of 2020 where it made perverse sense to grandstand, not reach agreement, and then run on these issues in the campaigns.
Given the above there was no chance for a successful special session.
Going forward there are rumors of another special session. The governor probably wants to extend his peacetime emergency orders, necessitating such a session. Unless he and the legislative leadership prepare for the special session it will again fail. The bonding bill, police reform, Covid-19 relief, and the peacetime emergency orders are entangled together and it will take a larger compromise across all of them to get anything done. Whether the incentives to compromise will have changed or hardened is yet to be seen.
Showing posts with label Minnesota 2020 legislative session. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Minnesota 2020 legislative session. Show all posts
Tuesday, June 23, 2020
Monday, May 18, 2020
Covid 19 and Minnesota 2020 Legislative Session: How it changed everything and nothing

entered the session with a partisanly-divided legislature preparing for the 2020 elections, and it exited on May 18, looking at a predictable special session to get its work done.
Where we were then and Where we are now
Remember where Minnesota in February 2020? The State had an imaginary budget surplus of $1.5 billion+. It was imagine because while inflation is counted for revenue but not obligations, this surplus was barely 3% of the nearly $48 billion adopted biennial budget. With inflation from 2019 and 2020 running at 2%, the real surplus was maybe $500 million.
The Minnesota DFL and Republicans were in a race to how to spend the money. Child care? Tax cuts? Special education? It was poised to be an election year spend to win year, with both parties hugely divided in terms of priorities.
But then in two fateful weeks in October it all changed. Covid-19 hit and by April it was clear the state was not imaginarily $1.5 billion surplus, but $2.4 billion in the hole. All non-related Covid-19 spending was out and the state was going to need to address the health crisis and think about what to do with this deficit. The DFL House and the GOP Senate were so divided to the point of partisan wearing of masks or not.
By law, Minnesota cannot have an operating deficit. It should have addressed this issue by May 17, or run the risk of making it worse later on. It did not. It did not adopt a bonding bill. It also did not ratify the collective bargaining agreement with state workers. It was divided over the Governor’s executive orders and the handling of Covid-19. It also did not do a lot of other stuff, necessitating a special session.
Covid-19 may have changed the issues but it did not alter the pre-existing partisan geographic divide. It only gave it a new face.
The New Normal or Special Sessionaplooza
It should not then be a surprise that yet again Minnesota is having a special session. This is part of the New Normal that began in 1997-98.
Since statehood in 1858 we have had a total of 54 special sessions, including the anticipated one later this year. This means that out of the 162 years of statehood, there is an average of one special session every three years (33.3%).
From 1858 through 1996 there were a total of 36 special sessions, averaging about once every four years (0.26).
From 1997 through and including 2020 (24 years), there have been 17 special sessions. This means on average there are three special sessions out of every four years (75%). I pick 1997-98 as a benchmark for what I call the new normal. The new normal or era of MN politics begins in about 1997-98 with the election of Ventura as governor in 1998 and the GOP take over of the MN House. This time period represents the point when DFL political power and influence waned in MN and the politics of the state became more polarized and divided.
Of the 53 special sessions that occurred since statehood. 22 or 45.2% were called to finish required work not completed during regular session. Since 1997 nine out of 17 or 52.9% have been to complete budget matters that needed to be completed. Two thoughts. First, getting all the work done during the constitutional deadline has always been a problem but it is even more so in the last 21 years. Second, it is clearly the case that in the last 20-21 years special sessions are far more frequent and have shifted from occurring on average once every four years to three out of four years. Third, since 1998, we have had two partial governmental shut downs (one under Dayton in 2011, one under Pawlenty in 2005), and a near shutdown under Ventura in 2001. Also under Pawlenty in 2009 there was a significant budget fight that involved his unallotment of money to balance the budget that was eventually struck down by the Minnesota Supreme Court in 2010.
Prior to 1997-1998 there were no government shutdowns in Minnesota history. Minnesota also appears to be at the top or near the top–at least in the last 20 or so years–in terms of the number of shutdowns (2) plus a near shutdown (1). In the entire history of Minnesota, there has been a total of five uses of unallotment, three occurred since 1997-1998.
So yes, it is clearly the case that the last 22 years does represent a new normal in many ways for Minnesota government, marked by the frequency of special sessions, shutdowns, use of unallotments. Minnesota, right down to having the only party-divided state legislature in America, is a mini version of the USA as a whole.
What is Next? Deja vu all over again
There will be a special session. A deal on bonding bill is possible but not guaranteed. But looming as even more pressing but ignored is the fate of the $2.4 billion deficit. No one seems to be talking about how and when it will be addressed. This is like 2002 all over again.
In 2002 in the last year of the Ventura administration the US and Minnesota economies crashed as a result of the 9/11 attacks. The state had gone from a massive budget surplus to a growing deficit. The Ventura administration responsibility proposed some tax increases and budget cuts to address the problem. Roger Moe majority leader in the Senate, and Tim Pawlenty, majority leader in the House teamed up and punted. They produced a phony bill that counted inflation for revenue but not obligations and delayed or pushed some spending into the next fiscal year, creating the illusion of a budget solution. We have never recovered from that political expediency.
Look to see in this election year 201 legislators do the same. They will delay the hard choices until after the election and into next year and make the budget problems worse than they are now.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)