Di Thao, Politics, and the Problem of Political Corruption

A thin line distinguishes legitimate political contributions and solicitations from bribery and
extortion.  Assuming all the allegations are true, St Paul Council member Dai Thao and his campaign manager crossed that line when they tended votes for money.  Yet even if they did nothing illegal,  this incident should not blind us to the bigger problem of how money corrupts politics and how political influence is leveraged, and, how contrary to what the Republicans are currently doing in the State Legislature, why we need more restrictions on the use of money for political purposes.
The Dai Thao example is what is called quid pro quo corruption–the offer or exchange of money for the performance of an official governmental act such as a vote on legislation.  This is what most people think of as political bribery or extortion and it is illegal under the federal bribery and gratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, or Minnesota Statutes § 609.42.    Some will contend that the offer or exchange of money for political influence is really what all political fund raising is about, so why should not all that be illegal?  The answer is yes...and no.
First, the critical legal line possibly crossed in the Thao incident is the explicit or implied exchange of money for the performance of an official act.  Bribery laws require a showing of criminal intent, and thanks to a recent Supreme Court decision, it must be an exchange of money for an official government act.  Smart politicians correctly and legally avoid bribery by never promising to alter a vote or perform an official act conditioned upon the payment or receipt of money.  They may tell supporters that they need their money so that they can continue to do their job or protect their interests but there is not an explicit promise to change a vote.  Moreover, elected officials generally also build fire walls that separate campaign from government staff to further make sure lines are not crossed.  All these are subtle but important distinctions that at least in theory contrast bribery or extortion from legitimate fund raising.
Yet quid pro quo corruption is the thinnest and perhaps most rare example of political corruption.  Many believe that corruption is more than bribery; it also has a more structural  aspect.  The issue is not just the explicit exchange of money for an official government act, it is how money is used to by not just access but repeated access.  In theory elected officials should return all phone calls or meet with all their constituents.  However, the names of big donors are recognized and are called back first or seen  more readily.
Corruption is when some interest groups can spend large sums of money in order to lobby and gain access to decision makers.  It is when lobbyists or big donors also serve as fund raisers to help solicit money for incumbents and candidates and then are rewarded for their efforts.  It is when, as in Minnesota, the legislative caucuses and political parties and their subunits are allowed to solicit and accept in the aggregate  unlimited amounts of money from individuals, political action committees, and lobbyists.  This is a problem because the parties set the political platforms and the caucuses the legislative agenda.  Money thus influences what parties believe and what legislation is heard.
The real issue is that money should not be the mechanism that determines how political power and influence are allocated.  Money might be a great way to allocate sailboats but it should not be the medium for handing out political influence and making political decisions.  Years ago Justice Rehnquist declared in  First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, “It might reasonably be concluded that those properties, so beneficial in the economic sphere, pose special dangers in the political sphere.”  Similarly, in  Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work Committee the Court declared that it was legitimate to worry that “substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go with the corporate form of organization should not be converted into political ‘war chests.’” At one time the Court aligned with public opinion, recognizing a broader sense of corruption tht extended far beyond what one sees in the Thao situation, suggesting that even if what he and is campaign manager did was not actually illegal, it was still inappropriate political behavior.
Yet under Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court has all but gutted political corruption laws.  In McDonnell v. United States the Court overturned the former Virginia’s bribery conviction, ruling that official acts did not extend to an exchange of gifts and money in return for arranging meetings and calling other public officials to discuss a donor’s business.  And in  McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, Roberts seemed to endorse the idea that purchasing influence is permissible when he declared:

Spending large sums of money in connection with elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s official duties, does not give rise to such quid pro quo corruption. Nor does the possibility that an individual who spends large sums may garner “influence over or access to” elected officials or political parties.

Contrary to Roberts, many of us do think that seeking access or influence is political corruption, and the current ways that we finance our campaigns and elections is a legal form of bribery and corruption.  The solution in part is to make candidates and parties less dependent on large donations, and to encourage more disclosure.  Unfortunately, the Republican majorities in the Minnesota legislature are eliminating the system for public financing of elections in the state, and are trying to restrict the power of the state to regulate money in politics.  Such an effort if successful, will only  fuel more behavior such as what we see with Dai Thao.