Keep Monday night open! I am going to offer an hour-long interactive video/audio chat with the public regarding the 2010 elections and offer predictions for how politics are likely to play out nationally and in Minnesota. The online event will take place Monday, November 15, 2010 from 7-8 p.m.(CST).
I'll be utilizing the latest technology, Elluminate Live!, a web conferencing program and virtual environment to provide a fluid, powerful video chat experience with up to 100 chat participants. I'll respond to questions and comments from those participants while leading a discussion about the 2010 election results locally and nationally. I also plan to address what Minnesota is likely to experience once a new governor is named and how it may differ depending on which candidate claims the spot and when they do so.
I'd love for anyone interested to 'attend' this online event. To join the session, please click here within 30 minutes of the session start time.
To view the hardware and software pre-requisites for Elluminate Live! click here.
Wednesday, November 10, 2010
Monday, November 8, 2010
Explaining Election 2010 Part III: Recount Mischief and Dayton’s Opportunity

Politics is about power–getting it, exercising it, and holding on to it. This explains the intensity of campaigns and of strategy in governance. This will also suggest some interesting issues as the recount moves forward and once a new governor is selected. Assume power is what politics is about. How should that play in for the recount, GOP control of the legislature, and Dayton, assuming he becomes governor? Here is my pale attempt at Machiavelli–writing about how to get and keep political power.
Recount Politics
Assuming by November 23, the margin between Dayton and Emmer is less than ½ of one–percent, there will be a mandatory recount. It is curious to note that at present the difference between the two candidates is approximately four-tenths of one percent. This past session the legislature voted to reduce the recount margin to 0.25% but it was removed in conference committee. Had it passed and been signed by the governor we might not be talking mandatory recount now.
It made sense to lower the threshold. Reforms in voting technology and in absentee balloting make errors less likely now than in the past. Second, in a state of 5 million people and approximately 3.6 million votes, differences of ½ of one percent are far greater in terms of the number of votes than in a state of 3 million voters. A one-half percent gap is a lot of voters. In this race, making 9,000 or so votes is far harder than a few hundred from even just a couple of years ago. Lacking a mandatory recount, Emmer would have to decide if he wishes to pay for an optional one. The mandatory recount will probably cost more than $100,000–at taxpayer expense. Had Pawlenty signed the bill taxpayers might be saving money.
Assume the recount proceeds. Sometime after December 14, when it ends the loser–and presumably Emmer–will have to make a choice. Do you accept the recount and move on or challenge it. Power politics suggests go for broke and challenge. Some worry the GOP will use the challenge to delay seating Dayton so that they can pass a quick budget, cut taxes, do redistricting, and address social issues while they have control of both branches. Yes, this is tempting. Pawlenty could use this to burnish conservative credentials for a presidential bid, demonstrating what he could do as a GOP president presiding over a GOP Congress.
But there is danger of overreach. Minnesotans are fed up with recounts. An appeal to the courts by Emmer and the GOP may look like a pure power grab and backlash against them. Thus Sutton and Emmer need to weigh backlash against opportunity. Backlash could end a GOP legislative majority in 2012, a year that may be more DFL friendly with Klobuchar and Obama on the ticket.
Dayton’s Opportunity
What should Dayton do? Some DFLers bemoan that he is powerless now that the GOP has legislative control. Not really. Look at how Pawlenty has outfoxed the DFL legislature for the last few years. MN governors have lots of power–vetoes, line item vetoes, executive orders, and other tools of appointment–to exercise. Dayton needs to use them.
The first issue for Dayton is who he plans to appoint to what. DFLers are salivating, finally patronage after 20 years+ of spoils drought. But Dayton and the DFL have an uneasy relationship and he may not necessarily appoint in ways that simply reward a party not always supportive of him. He needs to appoint to reward supporters, cement his coalition, and build for the future to take back DFL control of the legislature in 2012.
First thought: Name Tom Horner to be in your administration. He offered on election night to serve the next governor. Take him up on that and use it as a way to build bridges with Independence Party people. This is an opportunity to reach out to moderates and pull them away from the IP to the DFL. The IP might be a permanent 10%party. Use this as a chance to bring them over and party-build. I hate to say that this is an opportunity for party-raiding but this is the time to do that.
Second thought: Dayton has a four year term. Because of redistricting, all House and Senate terms are two years. Use this time frame to pressure the GOP. They want to hold power. If they overreach in the next two years you can point that out in 2012. Will the GOP risk cuts to K-12 and throw grandma out of the nursing home when they face election? Force the GOP to make the tough budget choices and then use the veto and bully pulpit as Pawlenty did to attack them.
Third thought: Effectively MN has an appointed judiciary with 90% of judges reaching the bench initially by gubernatorial appointment. Dayton will be the first DFLer in 20 years to appoint judges. Use that opportunity wisely.
Conclusion
Crisis is both a challenge and opportunity. Dayton, Emmer, the DFL, and the GOP face crises if they wish to maintain political power. Times like now power is in flux and opportunities portend.
Labels:
Dayton,
Emmer,
Minnesota Governors Race,
Pawlenty,
recount,
Tom Horner
Saturday, November 6, 2010
Explaining the Election 2010 Part II: How and Why Dayton (Apparently) Won
Unless the recount reverses it, Mark Dayton is Minnesota’s next governor and the first DFLer to win since Perpich in 1986. Contrary to assertions by GOP State Party Chair Tony Sutton that something smells fishy when Republicans win control of the legislature and the Oberstar seat but lose the governor’s race, neither fraud nor shenanigans need be invoked to explain the outcome. Instead, the simple answer lies in the fact that Tom Emmer and the GOP ran a horrible campaign and it was only the backlash against Obama and the Democrats that made it as close as it was.
No Fraud, No Foul
At the most simple level, by the logic of Sutton’s statement the GOP should have won the offices of Secretary of State, Auditor, and Attorney General, but they did not. Additionally, Sutton apparently ignores the phenomena of ticket splitting–voting one way at the legislative and another at the constitutional office level. Finally, by his logic, one could argue that Pawlenty should not have been elected, at least in 2006, because of the overwhelming vote for DFLers that year.
No, Sutton’s comments don’t make sense. They instead prematurely raise the specter of fraud, seeking to insinuate that because (in his belief) Franken only beat Coleman due to fraud, the same must be true here. Of course Sutton forgets that Coleman was never able to prove widespread fraud in court and his attorney, when appearing before the Minnesota Supreme Court, admitted the same. As I have written elsewhere, the best studies and empirical evidence on voter fraud is that it is negligible at best. Fraud is the unlikely answer for why Dayton won.
Instead, Sutton’s comments remind me of the great line from Hamlet: “The lady doth protest too much.” The real roots of Dayton’s victory lie in part in how bad Sutton, Emmer, and the GOP were in running the governor’s race.
Dayton’s Candidacy
Unfortunately we do not have exit polls to assess fully why people voted the way they did. We do have election returns revealing that Dayton won the metro area and St. Louis County as expected, and he also did well in other rural areas, at least compared to recent DFLers. But our information is limited. Thus, some conjecture is necessary.
Dayton’s apparent victory stemmed from several advantages he had. First, there was the overwhelming name recognition, especially among the elderly. As flawed as most pre-election polls were, this name recognition helped. Elderly vote, and that matters.
Second, Dayton was the only major party candidate with a lieutenant governor from greater Minnesota (here the Iron Range). This advantage was critical to Dayton’s DFL primary victory.
Third, Dayton had public sector union endorsements because of his stance against more budget cuts. While unions are experiencing declining political clout, one can presume AFSCME got out the vote to help Dayton and preserve their jobs.
Thus, think about it–Dayton reunited the old DFL coalition of urban liberals, unions, and the Iron Range. This is the classic recipe for DFL success in yesteryear. He was the first DFLer to bring this coalition together since Perpich. He did it with a reinventing of the old Perpich slogan of making Minnesota the “brainpower state.” This time Dayton stressed education in general, appealed to female voters, and forged a 2010 version of the 1986 message. How odd? An almost back to the future campaign tactic. Long term, such a coalition may not work, especially if your name is not Dayton, but this time it did.
But one should also not forget Dayton’s fortune helped. He outspent Emmer. He stayed on message talking about education and benefitted from a state less adverse to taxes than the nation as a whole.
Emmer’s Candidacy
Emmer ran a terrible campaign. It started with his convention speech when he declared he would run from the right and not the center. Generally you cannot win from the extreme when you only motivate your base and do not appeal to swing voters. The balance of power is capturing swings. Nationally, Democrats had the swings in 2006 and 2008, but lost them in 2010. Emmer never had them in 2010 since he disavowed them from the start.
Second, Emmer had a terrible summer. His missteps on taxes and tips cost him. He let the DFL paint him as a right-wing nut and he never overcame that image. In someways he was swiftboated by the DFL and like Kerry in 2004, he never overcame that image.
Third, Emmer had a McCain problem. In 2008 McCain knew “change” was the mantra of the year but how to run on change when you are of the same party of sitting president whom the public wants to change? Pawlenty was Emmer’s Bush. Minnesotans wanted change and the DFL tied Emmer to Pawlenty. Emmer talked of change but had the same problem when McCain talked of it.
Finally, the GOP and Emmer tried to use the national strategy at the state level. It worked with the legislative races, but not with the gubernatorial race so much. Sometimes cookie cutter strategies do not pan out.
The Horner Effect
How did Horner factor in? Whom did he hurt? I think he hurt Emmer more, but not for reasons most think.
I participated in a Republican Jewish forum about one week before the election. Sue Jeffers, Mitch Berg, and others were on the panel with me. When someone asked about whether they should worry about moderate GOPS such as Arnie Carlson, David Durenburger, and Al Quie endorsing Horner, Jeffers and others said let them go. They disparaged them as RINOs and were glad to see them go. Emmer and Sutton simply wrote off and ignored the old moderate Republicans, taking the Jim Demint tactic about ideological purity above coalition and victory.
The Horner press conference where many former GOP legislators endorsed him spoke also to that alienation they felt. Similarly, on November 5, I spoke to the Minneapolis Rotary club and lunched with one of my favorite former GOP state senators who expressed the same feeling–they were not wanted!
My point? Horner did not steal voters from Emmer. Emmer never went after them. Even if Emmer were not in the race I doubt Emmer would have gotten them. Either they would have stayed home or at best split with Dayton. But given Emmer’s lack of appeal to swings, Dayton’s victory might have been greater.
The Oberstar Effect
Oberstar lost because he ignored his district and took his victory for granted. It was like a page out of Edwin O’Connor’s "The Last Hurrah." One DFL precinct captain told me she never got a call from the Oberstar people. Additionally, the southern part of the 8th district is more conservative than the northern part and Oberstar was weak there, counting on the northern part to rescue him. It did not because he ignored it.
However, the Democrats on the Range are changing. They are perhaps becoming more of what used to be called Reagan Democrats. This is a concern for the DFL in the future.
Overall, had Oberstar run a better campaign and won Dayton might have done even better than he did.
Conclusion
A better than expected Dayton campaign, a horrible campaign from the right by Emmer, a national GOP anti-Obama surge, and a pathetic Oberstar campaign can account for much of the gubernatorial outcome. One need not invoke fraud or nefarious reasons to explain Dayton’s victory.
Last word
I predicted a 46% (Dayton), 43% (Emmer), and 12% (Horner) result. The final was tally as of today is 43.6%, 43.2%, and 11.9%. Judge for yourself how I did, especially compared to the pre-election polls!
No Fraud, No Foul
At the most simple level, by the logic of Sutton’s statement the GOP should have won the offices of Secretary of State, Auditor, and Attorney General, but they did not. Additionally, Sutton apparently ignores the phenomena of ticket splitting–voting one way at the legislative and another at the constitutional office level. Finally, by his logic, one could argue that Pawlenty should not have been elected, at least in 2006, because of the overwhelming vote for DFLers that year.
No, Sutton’s comments don’t make sense. They instead prematurely raise the specter of fraud, seeking to insinuate that because (in his belief) Franken only beat Coleman due to fraud, the same must be true here. Of course Sutton forgets that Coleman was never able to prove widespread fraud in court and his attorney, when appearing before the Minnesota Supreme Court, admitted the same. As I have written elsewhere, the best studies and empirical evidence on voter fraud is that it is negligible at best. Fraud is the unlikely answer for why Dayton won.
Instead, Sutton’s comments remind me of the great line from Hamlet: “The lady doth protest too much.” The real roots of Dayton’s victory lie in part in how bad Sutton, Emmer, and the GOP were in running the governor’s race.
Dayton’s Candidacy
Unfortunately we do not have exit polls to assess fully why people voted the way they did. We do have election returns revealing that Dayton won the metro area and St. Louis County as expected, and he also did well in other rural areas, at least compared to recent DFLers. But our information is limited. Thus, some conjecture is necessary.
Dayton’s apparent victory stemmed from several advantages he had. First, there was the overwhelming name recognition, especially among the elderly. As flawed as most pre-election polls were, this name recognition helped. Elderly vote, and that matters.
Second, Dayton was the only major party candidate with a lieutenant governor from greater Minnesota (here the Iron Range). This advantage was critical to Dayton’s DFL primary victory.
Third, Dayton had public sector union endorsements because of his stance against more budget cuts. While unions are experiencing declining political clout, one can presume AFSCME got out the vote to help Dayton and preserve their jobs.
Thus, think about it–Dayton reunited the old DFL coalition of urban liberals, unions, and the Iron Range. This is the classic recipe for DFL success in yesteryear. He was the first DFLer to bring this coalition together since Perpich. He did it with a reinventing of the old Perpich slogan of making Minnesota the “brainpower state.” This time Dayton stressed education in general, appealed to female voters, and forged a 2010 version of the 1986 message. How odd? An almost back to the future campaign tactic. Long term, such a coalition may not work, especially if your name is not Dayton, but this time it did.
But one should also not forget Dayton’s fortune helped. He outspent Emmer. He stayed on message talking about education and benefitted from a state less adverse to taxes than the nation as a whole.
Emmer’s Candidacy
Emmer ran a terrible campaign. It started with his convention speech when he declared he would run from the right and not the center. Generally you cannot win from the extreme when you only motivate your base and do not appeal to swing voters. The balance of power is capturing swings. Nationally, Democrats had the swings in 2006 and 2008, but lost them in 2010. Emmer never had them in 2010 since he disavowed them from the start.
Second, Emmer had a terrible summer. His missteps on taxes and tips cost him. He let the DFL paint him as a right-wing nut and he never overcame that image. In someways he was swiftboated by the DFL and like Kerry in 2004, he never overcame that image.
Third, Emmer had a McCain problem. In 2008 McCain knew “change” was the mantra of the year but how to run on change when you are of the same party of sitting president whom the public wants to change? Pawlenty was Emmer’s Bush. Minnesotans wanted change and the DFL tied Emmer to Pawlenty. Emmer talked of change but had the same problem when McCain talked of it.
Finally, the GOP and Emmer tried to use the national strategy at the state level. It worked with the legislative races, but not with the gubernatorial race so much. Sometimes cookie cutter strategies do not pan out.
The Horner Effect
How did Horner factor in? Whom did he hurt? I think he hurt Emmer more, but not for reasons most think.
I participated in a Republican Jewish forum about one week before the election. Sue Jeffers, Mitch Berg, and others were on the panel with me. When someone asked about whether they should worry about moderate GOPS such as Arnie Carlson, David Durenburger, and Al Quie endorsing Horner, Jeffers and others said let them go. They disparaged them as RINOs and were glad to see them go. Emmer and Sutton simply wrote off and ignored the old moderate Republicans, taking the Jim Demint tactic about ideological purity above coalition and victory.
The Horner press conference where many former GOP legislators endorsed him spoke also to that alienation they felt. Similarly, on November 5, I spoke to the Minneapolis Rotary club and lunched with one of my favorite former GOP state senators who expressed the same feeling–they were not wanted!
My point? Horner did not steal voters from Emmer. Emmer never went after them. Even if Emmer were not in the race I doubt Emmer would have gotten them. Either they would have stayed home or at best split with Dayton. But given Emmer’s lack of appeal to swings, Dayton’s victory might have been greater.
The Oberstar Effect
Oberstar lost because he ignored his district and took his victory for granted. It was like a page out of Edwin O’Connor’s "The Last Hurrah." One DFL precinct captain told me she never got a call from the Oberstar people. Additionally, the southern part of the 8th district is more conservative than the northern part and Oberstar was weak there, counting on the northern part to rescue him. It did not because he ignored it.
However, the Democrats on the Range are changing. They are perhaps becoming more of what used to be called Reagan Democrats. This is a concern for the DFL in the future.
Overall, had Oberstar run a better campaign and won Dayton might have done even better than he did.
Conclusion
A better than expected Dayton campaign, a horrible campaign from the right by Emmer, a national GOP anti-Obama surge, and a pathetic Oberstar campaign can account for much of the gubernatorial outcome. One need not invoke fraud or nefarious reasons to explain Dayton’s victory.
Last word
I predicted a 46% (Dayton), 43% (Emmer), and 12% (Horner) result. The final was tally as of today is 43.6%, 43.2%, and 11.9%. Judge for yourself how I did, especially compared to the pre-election polls!
Labels:
base politics,
Dayton,
DFL,
Emmer,
GOP,
Minnesota Governors Race,
Obama,
Sutton,
Tom Horner,
voter fraud
Thursday, November 4, 2010
Explaining Election 2010 Part I: Obama's Errors
Why did the Democrats lose on Tuesday? Explanations will range from the election being a referendum on Obama, Obamacare, and perhaps the economy. Pundits and politicians–both Democratic and Republican–will contend that Obama strayed too far to the left, now forcing him and his party to the right as they prepare for 2012.Yet this explanation and strategy fails to capture the full scope of the errors committed by the Democrats. What were those errors? Simply put, he ignored the basic rules of politics that he appeared to understand so well in 2008.
The Narrative. At its most basic, politics is the power of a compelling narrative. It is a story that describes who you are and what you want to accomplish. The Democratic narrative for 2008 was simple–“Change.” Obama and the Democrats promised change, and that drove them to power. But they lacked a good narrative this year.
In a year where the economy still stunk, how did Obama defend his stimulus bill, financial reform, and health care changes? The narrative was simple: “It could have been worse (had we not acted).” Such a narrative hardly inspires voters or wins over swing voters, but that was their narrative. For the Republicans, their narrative was also simple–“change.” They appropriated the Democratic narrative and used it against them.
Leadership. Obama demonstrated a striking lack of leadership. He wanted health care and financial reform but he delegated the tasks to Congress. The same was true with global warming and other issues. Yet Obama failed to take ownership for the legislation, letting others drive the agenda, producing changes that were more pork than policy.
Timidity. Obama and the Democrats promised a lot, but delivered very little. They passed stimulus bills and financial reform, but their scope was muted. They were not bold but cropped, failing to really address the depth of economic and financial reforms that plagued the nation. Similarly, he proposed closing Gitmo and ending the war in Iraq. Neither really occurred. He did little to pressure Israel for peace. In many ways, the Obama Administration coopted itself into being less bold than it needed to be to effect change.
Siding with the banks. Consistently Obama got it wrong on the economy. He continued Bush’s TARP policy to bail out the banks. He again sided with them on foreclosure. He did not press them far enough on bonuses. Consistently he threw away the Democrat economic populist advantage. He looked to many that he favored banks over homeowners and workers.
Party Discipline. Can you imagine Lyndon Johnson pleading with a Ben Nelson to vote for financial reform? Obama could not even get his own party behind him to support policies he wanted.
Republicans. From day one the Republicans sought to sabotage Obama and the Democrats. Foolishly he tried to placate Republicans even though the latter were not bargaining in good faith. One or two tries to bargain with them should have demonstrated this futility.
Define or be defined. John Kerry is the poster child for swiftboating. Politics is about defining yourself and the opponent or be defined. Obama let himself and his policies get defined–such as Obamacare–and he never recovered from that, forcing Democrats into a defensive posture.
Rewarding friends. Winning campaigns is about building coalitions. It is also about rewarding supporters. To build a lasting coalition one has to reward supporters. Obama forgot this. Unions worked hard for him in '08 but he told them to wait on The Employee Free Choice Act. Gays and Lesbians wanted him to repeal “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” but he also told them to wait. The middle class wanted jobs and economic help, he assisted the banks instead. At almost every critical point Obama alienated supporters by telling them to wait. As a result they abandoned him on Tuesday.
Modifying the Filibuster. Democrats had 60 votes in the Senate but acted like they were powerless. The filibuster rule meant Obama’s agenda was held hostage to the likes of Ben Nelson and Mary Landrieu. The first act of the Senate should have been to repeal this rule.
All politics is national. Tip O’Neill once said all politics is local. Actually it is the reverse. National issues now drive local politics. This happened across the 50 states as local elections became referenda on Obama. Democrats in local races in 2006 and 2008 ran against Bush, this time Republicans did the same by running against Obama.
The roots of the Democratic demise go back to day one with Obama. There are many things he should have done differently but mostly it was to forget the basic rules of politics in 2010 that he appeared to understand so well in 2008.
Saturday, October 30, 2010
Why Vote. . .and How?

Growing up in New York a wonderful woman next door turned to me on Election Day in the 1960s and advised me: "Don't vote, it only encourages them to run!" This advice, from an 80 year old plus woman, perhaps under the influence of whiskey, expressed dissatisfaction with politicans and candidates whom she saw as narrow-minded and petty.
I am reminded of her as I think about the looming Election Day this Tuesday. Many of us will render our choices based on fear, self-interest, anger, or who knows what. None of those reasons should guide our voting choices. We can do better than that.
Tom Horner, the Independence Party candidate for Minnesota governor, is haunted by the wasted vote syndrome. He should not be. Nor should any other candidate for office who is considered a longshot, such as Jim Meffert in Minnesota or a Charlie Crist in Florida. Individuals should select their first choice–vote your hope nor your fears–as the saying goes, regardless of whether the choice is Horner, Emmer, or Dayton for governor, or another candidate for another office.
But the first choice of whom to vote for should be more than simply casting a ballot out of anger, self-interest, or partisanship. It should be a vote for our collective future, not simply a private preference. Voting is a private act, but it should also promote a public good.
Voting: A Tale of Two Presidents
What do I mean by saying voting should promote a public good? Political scientists write about the strategy and reasons for voting. Some say we vote based on partisan preferences or affiliation. Others contend it is premised on looking backward, or maybe to the future, or based on economics (“It’s the economy, stupid” as James Carville would say). All of these theories have descriptive cogency. But voting should also have a normative or ethical component.
There are good reasons for why to vote a particular way and there are bad reasons. The worst in my opinion was launched 30 years ago with Ronald Reagan who closed out his campaign by asking voters “If they were better off now than four years ago.” This mantra propelled narrow self-interested greed into American politics, asking voters only to consider their own selfishness when they vote. The path from this Reagan quote to Gordon Geckos’ (of the movie Wall Street) “Greed is good” is direct and short.
The best reason or motive to vote? It came from another president in my lifetime–John Kennedy. It was not an election slogan or gimmick but the most famous call to duty from his inaugural address in 1961: “Ask not what your country can do for you but what you can do for your country.” It was a call to what is noble not base, to the public good and not the private interest. It was a call to look beyond partisanship to what is best for all of us.
JFK’s call sounds quaint in the era of self-interested partisanship. But it is precisely the sentiment that needs to guide voters this year.
What is a Wasted Vote?
As you ponder your voting choices prior to Tuesday, think about your choices and reasons to vote.
Vote not as a Democrat, Republican, Independent, or something else. Vote as an American or Minnesotan.
Vote not on the basis of partisanship but on what is in the best interest of the country or the state.
Vote not on the basis of narrow self-interest but what is in the collective public interest of us all.
Vote not on the basis of simplistic attack ads and 10 second sound bites but with a sense of realism. Solutions to our collective problems are not simple and are not rooted in blaming "those people."
Vote not on the basis of promises that seem too good to be true but on what is realistic and seems possible.
Vote not on the basis of whether you are now better off than four years ago but ask how your choice will improve our state or country four years form now.
Vote not because you want to freeze the hands of time in some halcyon mythic time of the past in order to take back your country. Recognize that the country belongs to all of us, but especially to a multi-cultural, multi-racial future where we are all in it together.
Vote for a world that will be better for your children, not just your bank account.
Remember, there are only two types of wasted votes: Those not cast and those where you vote for your second choice. Vote for the candidate of your choice, but make sure your choice is what will promote the best interests of us all.
Political scientists like me make predictions based on patterns we have discovered. Prove me wrong and vote for what is best for us all, and make that your first choice.
Labels:
Dayton,
Emmer,
Minnesota Governors Race,
Tom Horner,
voting
Friday, October 29, 2010
Poll Predictions and Calling a Winner (Dayton)
Continued Poll Confusion?
Poll uncertainties continue to dominate Minnesota politics as recent surveys produce vastly divergent results. The MPR poll reveals a 12-point lead for Dayton in the governor’s race, while other surveys yield a narrower lead for Dayton. How do we explain all this?
As I argued in an earlier blog, part of the problem with the surveys is that they are not necessarily capturing the underlying demographic reality of Minnesota. The MPR poll vastly overestimates the percentage of the population which is DFL and it underestimates the percentage who are independent or who have no firm partisan identification.
In addition, many of these polls are done on the cheap, failing to develop good samples that balance appropriately the percentage of the population which is Twin Cities urban, suburban, Iron Range, and greater Minnesota. Other problems are under-sampling by age, caused in part by missing cell phone-only users. There are also issues of who actually picks up a LAN line to answer a call. Some of these survey problems can be solved by increased samples sizes but that means more costly surveys.
But other problems are not solved with money. They are rooted in assumptions about what the state looks like demographically, especially from a partisan perspective. To repeat an earlier blog, here is my approximate assumption of what the state looks like:
35% DFL or leaning DFL
30% GOP or leaning GOP
10% Independence Party (IP) or leaning IP
25% Other or no party identification
Any poll that vastly departs from these approximates, such as the MPR poll, is flawed from the start. My assumptions of these percentages are based on post-2008 election exit polls and they reveal declining support for the DFL and GOP since then. The estimates are also based on talks with party leaders and analysis of voting trends, and efforts to piece together some valid data from the polls.
Finally, let me also say that my estimates are rooted in someone who, in previous a life, worked on or ran about 50 campaigns back in NY, my knowledge gained from teaching campaigns and elections and research methods (I wrote a book on the topic), my knowledge of Minnesota, and finally, some gut intuitions.
Predicting the Governor’s Race
Given the above, my prediction for the governor’s race? Here is how I analyze it.
Each of the three major candidates is doing a pretty good job holding their bases. Thus, I start with Dayton, Emmer, and Horner at 35%, 30%, and 10%. While the polls have been flawed, two initial truths come out: 1) Dayton and Emmer are holding about 80% of the bases and Dayton and Horner are capturing most of the swing or moderate voters. I am going to assume Horner is holding about 90% of his base. Emmer has been less successful in attracting the swings. Dayton is capturing about 50% of the moderates, Horner is about 30%, Emmer 20%.
Thus, here is my first calculation.
Dayton .8 X 35% = 28%. .50 X 25%= 13.75%. Dayton total= 40.5%
Emmer .8 X30% = 24%. .20 X 25%= 5% Emmer total= 29%
Horner .9 X 10%= 9% .30 X 25% =7.5% Horner total = 16.5%
However, this first calculation makes several assumptions. It assumes no undecided voters or that undecideds break in a pattern noted above. Second it assumes support for all of the three candidates is firm and that everyone will come to vote. I do not make this assumption. We know at least three additional things that correct these numbers.
First, turnout this year will be less than in 2008. In 2008 approximately 77% of the eligible population voted. Mark Ritchie estimates 60% turnout this year. I think 55-60% if realistic. This is 17-22 points less than 2008. Many of these not voting will be DFL leaning voters who came out for Obama. This means among likely voters, the smaller electorate this year will be more heavily GOP than two years ago.
Second, national polls and state polls reveal GOP voters more highly motivated than either the DFL or swings. Women (swings and part of the DFL base) are less motivated to vote compared to males. Young are less likely to vote than old (although old seem to favor Dayton). Support for Dayton is less firm, passionate, or motivated to come out and vote for him.
Third, as Election Day looms and it looks less likely that Horner can win, swings plagued by the spoiler fear (A vote for Horner is a vote for my worst or last choice) will abandon him. There is also a polarized electorate problem I have discussed. Some will opt not to vote, some wills shift to Dayton, a few to Emmer.
These three factors will produce a likely electorate more GOP than my initial numbers suggest. This is the issue of the likely voter. Correcting for these three realities is not a science, but an estimate or gut guess. I think Horner fades down to about 10-12% when a final count is done. He may even fade lower. Dayton picks up some Horner votes and the more GOP leaning electorate yields this as my estimate.
The Winner is . . .Dayton!
Dayton 46%
Emmer 43%
Horner 10%
Other 01%
I am guessing Dayton has about a 3% lead in the polls, it may be as high as 5%, depending on whether my initial guesses about the size of the bases, capture of the swings, and shape of the electorate are accurate.
I am not offering science here, but best estimates or guesses. Now let the voters decide.
Poll uncertainties continue to dominate Minnesota politics as recent surveys produce vastly divergent results. The MPR poll reveals a 12-point lead for Dayton in the governor’s race, while other surveys yield a narrower lead for Dayton. How do we explain all this?
As I argued in an earlier blog, part of the problem with the surveys is that they are not necessarily capturing the underlying demographic reality of Minnesota. The MPR poll vastly overestimates the percentage of the population which is DFL and it underestimates the percentage who are independent or who have no firm partisan identification.
In addition, many of these polls are done on the cheap, failing to develop good samples that balance appropriately the percentage of the population which is Twin Cities urban, suburban, Iron Range, and greater Minnesota. Other problems are under-sampling by age, caused in part by missing cell phone-only users. There are also issues of who actually picks up a LAN line to answer a call. Some of these survey problems can be solved by increased samples sizes but that means more costly surveys.
But other problems are not solved with money. They are rooted in assumptions about what the state looks like demographically, especially from a partisan perspective. To repeat an earlier blog, here is my approximate assumption of what the state looks like:
35% DFL or leaning DFL
30% GOP or leaning GOP
10% Independence Party (IP) or leaning IP
25% Other or no party identification
Any poll that vastly departs from these approximates, such as the MPR poll, is flawed from the start. My assumptions of these percentages are based on post-2008 election exit polls and they reveal declining support for the DFL and GOP since then. The estimates are also based on talks with party leaders and analysis of voting trends, and efforts to piece together some valid data from the polls.
Finally, let me also say that my estimates are rooted in someone who, in previous a life, worked on or ran about 50 campaigns back in NY, my knowledge gained from teaching campaigns and elections and research methods (I wrote a book on the topic), my knowledge of Minnesota, and finally, some gut intuitions.
Predicting the Governor’s Race
Given the above, my prediction for the governor’s race? Here is how I analyze it.
Each of the three major candidates is doing a pretty good job holding their bases. Thus, I start with Dayton, Emmer, and Horner at 35%, 30%, and 10%. While the polls have been flawed, two initial truths come out: 1) Dayton and Emmer are holding about 80% of the bases and Dayton and Horner are capturing most of the swing or moderate voters. I am going to assume Horner is holding about 90% of his base. Emmer has been less successful in attracting the swings. Dayton is capturing about 50% of the moderates, Horner is about 30%, Emmer 20%.
Thus, here is my first calculation.
Dayton .8 X 35% = 28%. .50 X 25%= 13.75%. Dayton total= 40.5%
Emmer .8 X30% = 24%. .20 X 25%= 5% Emmer total= 29%
Horner .9 X 10%= 9% .30 X 25% =7.5% Horner total = 16.5%
However, this first calculation makes several assumptions. It assumes no undecided voters or that undecideds break in a pattern noted above. Second it assumes support for all of the three candidates is firm and that everyone will come to vote. I do not make this assumption. We know at least three additional things that correct these numbers.
First, turnout this year will be less than in 2008. In 2008 approximately 77% of the eligible population voted. Mark Ritchie estimates 60% turnout this year. I think 55-60% if realistic. This is 17-22 points less than 2008. Many of these not voting will be DFL leaning voters who came out for Obama. This means among likely voters, the smaller electorate this year will be more heavily GOP than two years ago.
Second, national polls and state polls reveal GOP voters more highly motivated than either the DFL or swings. Women (swings and part of the DFL base) are less motivated to vote compared to males. Young are less likely to vote than old (although old seem to favor Dayton). Support for Dayton is less firm, passionate, or motivated to come out and vote for him.
Third, as Election Day looms and it looks less likely that Horner can win, swings plagued by the spoiler fear (A vote for Horner is a vote for my worst or last choice) will abandon him. There is also a polarized electorate problem I have discussed. Some will opt not to vote, some wills shift to Dayton, a few to Emmer.
These three factors will produce a likely electorate more GOP than my initial numbers suggest. This is the issue of the likely voter. Correcting for these three realities is not a science, but an estimate or gut guess. I think Horner fades down to about 10-12% when a final count is done. He may even fade lower. Dayton picks up some Horner votes and the more GOP leaning electorate yields this as my estimate.
The Winner is . . .Dayton!
Dayton 46%
Emmer 43%
Horner 10%
Other 01%
I am guessing Dayton has about a 3% lead in the polls, it may be as high as 5%, depending on whether my initial guesses about the size of the bases, capture of the swings, and shape of the electorate are accurate.
I am not offering science here, but best estimates or guesses. Now let the voters decide.
Labels:
Dayton,
Emmer,
Minnesota Governors Race,
Tom Horner
Monday, October 25, 2010
As Minnesota Goes, So Goes the Nation? Not in 2010
The phrase used to be “As Maine goes, so goes the nation.” The origin and irony of the phrase was in the state’s reputation as a political bellwether for national presidential politics, culminating in 1936 when it supported Alf Landon over FDR for president.Yet just the opposite seems to be true for Minnesota. It was the only state to go for Mondale in 1984 when the rest of the country boarded the Reagan landslide train. Minnesota has a reputation for third party politics–think of Floyd Olson and Jesse Ventura. It also has a progressive streak that included socialists in the 1920s and 30s, Hubert Humphrey, Walter Mondale, Eugene McCarthy, and Paul Wellstone. Minnesota seems to march to its own drummer. In 2010 that exceptionalism may lead to mark Dayton winning the governorship.
Minnesota: The Fargo Factor v. Lake Wobegon?
Minnesota has the Fargo factor (think the movie) with an endearing sense of traditionalism and Nordic rugged individualism. But there is a Lake Wobegon aspect where we do think all the children are above average. The reality of Minnesota is caught somewhere between these two pop culture images.
Explanations for the state’s political idiosyncrasy are varied. Some locate it in Minnesota’s political culture, but stating that tells us nothing. It is like saying there is something in the drinking water. Others contend that the Scandianian culture is an explanation. Perhaps true, but the state is more German than Nordic and the influx of immigrants from other parts of the world should have a bigger impact on politics than it has if this were true.
I describe Minnesota as a very religious state with a tradition of religious activism that expresses a dislike of corruption and a demand for reform and clean government. It is a liberal state with conservative pulls. It has a populist tradition, a commitment to equality, and a generally positive view of an activist government. Historically is has expressed a fear of accumulation of power in business, with government historically viewed to protect people from business. Some of this may be changing, but this is the core of Minnesota politically.
Explaining Minnesota’s Independent Streak
How do we explain Minnesota’s independent streak? The state has numerous groups and regions that compete and none of them are dominant. This means that the key to winning in Minnesota is by building alliances to forge coalitions. The process of coalition building has resulted in tight party competition, occasional third party support, and high voter turnout.
In addition, Minnesota has a long tradition of non-partisan and partisan elections. This combination of two types of elections produces an electorate that is not historically as committed to party voting as one might see in other states. For example, from 1913 to 1974 the Minnesota Legislature was non-partisan. Local races remain non-partisan, as is true with judicial races. Parties have and remain powerful forces in the state, but their allure is waning. No party–DFL, GOP, or GOP–commands 51% of the population. Today I think it is DFL 35%, GOP 30%, Independence 10%, and no party at 25%. The point here is that politics is competitive and the balance of power is in mobilizing the base but more importantly, in moving the swing voters to your side. Win the swings, win the state.
Minnesota v USA in 2010
Winning over the swings is not Einstein politics. This is real simple Politics 101. But it is often forgotten by many. The DFL for years lost control of the center which is why it has not won the governor’s race since 1986 and why in 1998 it lost the House. It was not until 2004 and 2006 that it learned to recapture the center and was rewarded with control of the House again. The same problem has plagued the national Democrats. Yet in 2008 it captured the center and the result was Obama’s victory along with strong congressional majorities.
Now the national Democrats have lost the center again, with the swings moving to the GOP this year. One can debate the reasons for this loss and whether Obama had alternative options with the progressives. Yet it is clear that in 2010 the Democrats have lost the swing voters, that jobs and opposition to taxes are major policy drivers, and that the GOP has the political narrative this year–it is “Change.” Sound familar?
All this should suggest a great year for the GOP in Minnesota and that Emmer is the next governor. But not necessarily so.
Tons of polls and surveys have been done this year. Many are awful. But some truths emerge. First, large majorities of Minnesotans recognize that taxes need to go up to address services. They have seen schools, roads, and bridges decay and now about 60% or so recognize a need for tax increases. Thus unlike nationally, the anti-tax message has limited appeal beyond a GOP base plus some swings.
Second, polls suggest that Dayton is capturing the bulk of the swing voters. Emmer is not getting many swings. Horner is getting them. Emmer is running base politics. By that, from the day he accepted his party nomination he declared he would run from the right and not from the center. Dumb move! He forgot the battle is from and for the center. He ran as and let the DFL paint him as a right-winger and he is paying the price. He is still in the race because Dayton has run a lackluster campaign and his supporters are not as excited or passionate about him as the Emmer voters are for their candidate. This explains Obama’s pep rally for Dayton over the weekend. Dayton needs his base–plus women and swings–to get excited and vote for him. If they do, Dayton bucks the national trend and wins.
Emmer may still win, but it is a battle. He needs his base to vote–and they will–he needs to pickup more swings–hard to see how–and he needs Dayton’s people to stay home on election day.
Labels:
Dayton,
Emmer,
Hubert Humphrey,
Jesse Ventura,
McCarthy,
Minnesota Governors Race,
Mondale,
Obama,
Paul Wellstone,
taxes,
Tom Horner
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)