Thursday, June 29, 2023

The Supreme Court’s Color Oblivious Constitution and the Road not Taken



            The Supreme Court’s Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College struck down affirmative action programs at both Harvard and the University of North Carolina in the name of the “color-blind” Constitution. Perhaps it would be better to describe the Court’s Orwellian fantasy doctrine as “color oblivious.” 

            The decision should have surprised no one and it well-telegraphed not just from its recent decisions chipping away at racial considerations when it came to college admissions, but perhaps from the very start of when the Supreme ever looked at the issue of affirmative action.

            The very first class I taught (co-taught) in college was a course entitled “Justice and Affirmative Action.”  It was  a long time ago.  I  have spent a life time and career thinking about race and affirmative action. What has always struck me is the unease Americans have when it comes to race.

            W.E.B. DuBois once proclaimed that the problem of color-line would be the problem of the twentieth century.  Yet the Supreme Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence has never really embraced it or understood the reality of American politics both historically and today.  Whether it was its 1857 Dred Scott v. Sanford which ruled that slaves were property and not persons, or the 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson  declaring separate but equal as an acceptable constitutional doctrine, the Court has more often than not failed to look beyond formal legal doctrines and see the reality of race in America. 

            The reality is of an American society that remains racist.  Our constitution was born of slavery and race. We fought a Civil War and a civil rights movement over it.    Yet the badges of slavery persist in all of our institutions including criminal justice, housing and education.  Affirmative action was never meant to be the sole tool to abate race, but instead one of several.  It recognized that there was a difference between the use of race for discriminatory as opposed to remedial reasons and that it was an illusion to say that simply passing law  making discrimination illegal would make it disappear.

            Affirmative action at the college admissions level recognized the failures of our society in confronting race.  Perhaps, just perhaps if we truly had integrated and quality schools for all and all students were free to pursue their excellence, affirmative action at the college level would not be necessary. But we do not live in that world.  We do not in part because of the Court’s own decisions such as San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez declaring that there is no constitutional right to education and that discrimination based on wealth is not illegal,  or Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver where the Court imposed limits on cross-district integration and thereby accelerated suburban white flight.  Both cases were from 1973—undermining civil rights and equal educational opportunities almost from the start.

            The 1978 Bakke v. University of California  was the Court’s first college affirmative action case.  It struck down the racial quota system in place, ruling that race could only be one of several factors  when making admission decisions.  The Court also declared that the only constitutional justification for racial considerations was to promote diversity in the classroom.  Yet Bakke ignored the fact that there was a small cluster of special admission’s slots given to the dean, presumably offered as legacy slots or for rich donors.

            Consistently the Court has ignored the privileged position of legacy admissions at Harvard and other schools. It has ignored the way rich donors can buy admissions for their children, as we say in the stories from a few years ago where individuals such as actress Lori Loughlin paid $500,000 to buy admission for her daughters. to USC.  The Court seems oblivious  to  how some private, prep, and boarding schools give some applicants a special advantage to get into elite schools such as Harvard and Yale. Such schools, one might note, that have produced the majority of Supreme Court Justices. 

            The Court in Bakke accepted the argument that racial considerations to help people of color  were a form of racial discrimination.  That assumption prevailed in all of the Court’s college affirmative action cases, as well as in its decisions, especially under the Rehnquist and then Roberts Courts, when it came to employment and redistricting.  Somehow just declare  the Constitution and the law racially neutral or blind and it will go away.

            Twenty years ago in  Grutter v. Bollinger the Court signaled its impatience with affirmative action when Justice O’Connor declared that she hoped in twenty-five years affirmative action would no longer be necessary. In the Fair Admissions, Inc case decided on June 29, the patience ended.  In part because Harvard and UNC could not say when they would no longer need to consider race to overcome discrimination, that is why the Court had to end it.  In effect, despite the fact that the Court in its decision discussed the history of race in America it was simply time to end it because it discriminated against white Caucasians (such as those individuals who brought the case) and because it just had to come to an end.

            The Supreme Court could have taken a different road in this case. It could have declared that the group bringing the case had no standing to sue because it had not suffered harm.  The Court could have said the Harvard plan was discriminatory toward Asian-Americans and ordered them to fix it without striking down all considerations of race.  But by the time we got to this case the Court had already gone down the wrong path.  It ignored how its own decisions have contributed to racial discrimination and the unequal educational opportunities  and how they have undermined  societal institutions to address racism. In effect, the color obliviousness of Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College  was a long time coming.

 

Trump is why the framers created the Electoral College

This blog originally appeared in The Hill. 


The possibility of a second Donald Trump presidency provides perhaps the strongest case ever for the Electoral College. Were the Electoral College to work as the Framers originally envisioned, there is no chance Trump would even be a serious candidate in 2024, let alone 2016 or 2020.

The Electoral College is perhaps the most maligned and misunderstood institution in American politics. There have been more efforts to alter or abolish it than any other institution, and polls suggest large percentages of the public support replacing it with a direct popular vote for president.

Historian James MacGregor Burns describes the U.S. in 1787, at the time of the drafting of the Constitution, as an experiment. It was an experiment in popular government. The world was full of monarchies, but nowhere did democracy exist or was there a government where the people could select their leaders.

As the constitutional Framers debated how to structure the new government, “fear” was the word of the day. Slave states feared the free; small states feared the larger ones. Everyone feared that if the new Constitution were framed wrong, they would lose. These disagreements led to the infamous three-fifths compromise, where slaves would count only as partial persons in determining population for congressional representation. Additionally, a recent uprising by farmers, known as Shay’s Rebellion, meant many at the convention feared that the people might not be capable or knowledgeable enough to vote.

When all this fear came to the presidency, the question was how to select that person. Alexander Hamilton originally proposed a president who would serve for life. While there was some talk of direct election of the president, there was little support for it. The less populous states worried that a direct popular vote would mean they would be dominated by states with more voters. The slave and free states each feared that the direct popular vote might work to their disadvantage. Thus the compromise — the Electoral College.

The idea was for the legislatures of each state to select electors who would be temporary, beholden to no one, with the sole duty of picking the president and vice-president. The presumption was these electors would be of sound judgment and character, and they would make the best choice for president. As Alexander wrote in Federalist No. 68: “The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications.”

Similarly, James Madison worried that with direct elections, “The ministers of foreign powers would have and make use of the opportunity to mix their intrigues & influence with the election.” Pierce Butler, another constitutional framer, worried that the “two great evils to be avoided are cabal at home and influence abroad.” The Electoral College would address both.

But partisan politics quickly undermined the original vision of the Electoral College, as each state sought to control its electors and how they would be selected. In the early nineteenth century, as the spirit of democracy spread, legislatures gradually let the people vote to select the electors. Later on, states changed their laws to allow for each qualifying candidate to designate their own slate of electors, with popular elections determining whose slate was entitled to cast the electoral votes. Finally, fearing that the electors might not vote as the people decided, “faithless electors” laws were enacted to compel them to vote the way the popular vote went. The Supreme Court upheld such laws in Colorado Department of State v. Baca.

Changing notions of what democracy means have led to erosion in support for the Electoral College. Five times in American history — 1824, 1876, 1888, 2000, and 2016 — the winner of the national popular vote lost the presidency to the winner of the Electoral College. Many Americans saw this as undemocratic and urged that the Electoral College should go. One alternative is the National Popular Vote, a compact for states to cast their electoral votes for whichever candidate wins the national popular vote.

Now enter Donald Trump. Twice impeached, although not convicted; allegedly the beneficiary of Russian interference in 2016; now facing two indictments, with more possibly coming; already held liable for sexual harassment, and facing many other lawsuits. He is implicated in the January 6 attack on the Capitol and expresses no remorse for his behavior. By one count, he lied more than 20,000 times in office.


Yet Trump’s base is with him. He is the odds-on favorite to win the GOP nomination and perhaps the presidency again. For the first time, America could have a convicted felon as president.

Our constitutional framers would have declared him unfit to be president. Were the Electoral College operating how they had originally intended, there is no way Trump would now be a viable candidate for president. Perhaps the prospect of a second Trump presidency is the best argument one can offer for retaining the Electoral College.

ChatGPT Evolution to Personhood Raises Questions of Legal Rights

This piece originally appeared in Bloomberg Law. 


As ChatGPS and and other forms of artificial intelligence take on more humanlike qualities, we need to ask two questions. When and how could ChatGPT be indicted for a crime? And at what point would pulling the plug on ChatGPT be murder?

When does an entity powered by AI acquire constitutional status as a person with rights? American law is rift with dichotomies; rights versus duties is the most common example. But so is the concept of personhood versus property. In theory, if you’re a person, you have rights. Conversely, property has no rights—it’s merely a thing owned by persons who may have some rights to it.

Yet legal dichotomies aren’t absolutes. Even Wesley Hohfeld’s famous 1918 Yale Law Journal article on rights and duties recognized that. The same is true with personhood and property.

Just because you’re a person doesn’t mean you have rights—or at least the full range of rights afforded to adults. Children are persons but have limited rights. Resident noncitizens in the US have some rights. In Dred Scott v. Sanford, the US Supreme Court ruled that slaves were property, not persons.

In Minor v. Happersett, the Supreme Court ruled that women, while citizens, still didn’t have the right to vote. Conversely, in County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R. Co.Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the court ruled that corporations were legally or constitutionally protected persons with rights. They can also be indicted for crimes.

And in Roe v. Wade, the court noted that although the Constitution refers to “person” 22 times, an unborn person was not entitled to constitutional personhood—it lacked rights.

Thus things can have rights. American legal history shows how the line between personhood and property is often thin and shifting.

When might an entity such as a robot or a computer powered by advanced AI acquire legal or constitutional personhood status? Christian theologians would say personhood is marked by possession of a soul; philosophers such as Immanuel Kant would argue that persons have the capacity for autonomy and choice. Perhaps genome researchers might say the DNA holds the clue, but for others, the idea of self-reflection or awareness is critical.

In 1950, computer scientist Alan Turing proposed a test to determine when a machine generated or produced intelligent behavior equivalent to a human. He argued that when such a machine produced language behavior and response to humans that was indistinguishable from normal human conversation, it was now thinking. For many, thinking or cognition—or at least its potential—is what separates persons with rights from things.

Are we close to a point when AI or ChatGPT passes the Turing test? Are we close to when such an entity is self-reflective or aware of itself? Perhaps. If so, then at some point soon the issue of when it acquires legal personhood and with that, rights and duties, is close.

The law now holds a manufacturer or owner responsible for a machine or product. The owner or maker has rights and duties. The machine doesn’t have any independent rights or duties. But at what point should it?

This isn’t a farfetched question. Increasingly, animals—normally and historically thought of as property—are acquiring rights, at least against abuse and neglect. Others are pressing to give them other legal protections, including standing and habeas corpus rights.

At what point might ChatGPT or an AI-power machine be guilty of a crime? What if it provides advice on how to commit fraud or plot a murder, it is possible to bring conspiracy, aiding and abetting, or obstruction of justice against it? If an AI-powered vehicle makes a choice to speed or navigate obstacles and then hits and kills someone, can it be indicted for murder or manslaughter?

Conversely, should ChatGPT be afforded Miranda rights and be told it has a right to remain silent? Consider the famous scene in “2001: A Space Odyssey” where Hal the computer seeks to kill astronaut Dave and the latter turns the power off on the former.

Can the former be charged with the crime? Can the latter be charged with the killing of an artificial person? Or think of the cyborgs—bioengineered humanoids in the 1982 motion picture “Blade Runner"—are they persons possessing legal rights and obligations?

These questions might seem silly right now. But as this and future generations of ChatGPT and AI roll out, the line between person and property will erode more, necessitating answered.

This article does not necessarily reflect the opinion of Bloomberg Industry Group, Inc., the publisher of Bloomberg Law and Bloomberg Tax, or its owners.

Author Information

David Schultz is a professor of political science and legal studies at Hamline University and a professor of law at University of Minnesota.

Write for Us: Author Guidelines

My latest interview appeared in Westlaw Today. 



Q&A: Will federal oversight improve Minneapolis policing?

    2023 CIVILRBRF 0075
    By Josh Numainville
    WESTLAW TODAY Civil Rights Briefing
    June 28, 2023
      (June 28, 2023) - Law professor David Schultz explains the significance of a recent U.S. Department of Justice report that found persistent civil rights violations by the Minneapolis Police Department and discusses what his own research unearthed about the city's payouts for police misconduct claims.
      Schultz, who recently released a first-of-its-kind statewide database1 on governmental payouts for police misconduct incidents in Minnesota, says the DOJ report raises important questions about how little Minneapolis has paid to resolve claims.
      He cautions that while the MPD will be subject to a consent decree mandating certain reforms as a result of the DOJ's investigation, it will likely take years to see meaningful change.
      Westlaw Today: What stood out to you about the DOJ's report on Minneapolis policing?
      David Schultz: The DOJ report2 is perhaps the most comprehensive ever done on policing in Minneapolis, with a more detailed analysis and statistics than the Minnesota Department of Human Rights Report3 from last year. The latter report concluded, "A pattern or practice of discrimination is present where the denial of rights consists of something more than isolated, sporadic incidents, but is repeated, routine, or of a generalized nature."
      The basic takeaway from the DOJ report is that the MPD violated First (free speech) and Fourth (illegal search and seizure) Amendment rights systematically, especially in terms of its use of force against people of color.
      In reaching that conclusion it is first important to understand two points concerning the DOJ report. First, its focus is on the use of excessive force. It did look at other issues such as police stops and what is often called racial profiling, but most of the report examined racial disparities in terms of use of force. Second, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that questions about the use of force raise constitutional questions, defining them as a Fourth Amendment search and seizure issue.
      The picture the report paints of Minneapolis is troubling. It reinforces a point that many of us in Minnesota have made for years — Minneapolis is a tale of two cities.
      As the report states: "The typical white family in the Twin Cities is doing better than the national average for white families, and the typical Black family in the Twin Cities is doing worse than the national average for Black families."
      The causes of the racial disparities are many, but when it comes to policing, the DOJ offers several stark conclusions:
      • The MPD uses unnecessary or excessive force across a range of tactics that include physical restraint, tasers and weapons.
      • Officers discriminate against people of color in their enforcement activities, including the use of force and traffic stops.
      • Despite banning neck restraints in 2020, the MPD still uses them.
      • Officers fail to intervene to prevent other officers from using excessive force and do not provide needed medical care.
      • The MPD violates the First Amendment rights of protestors and the media to cover, photograph, or report on police misconduct.
      Overall, the report reaches a series of conclusions that the MPD is out of compliance with the U.S. Constitution, in part because of poor or improper training or supervision.
      WT: Were you surprised by the DOJ's findings?
      DS: Nothing in this report came as a surprise, at least to me. There are two reasons for this. One, back in the 1990s I was a researcher at the Institute on Race and Poverty at the University of Minnesota, and we documented the extensive racial discrimination in Minneapolis, and we found the Twin Cities area to be one of the three most segregated metropolitan areas in the nation. Thus, the problems with race should not have been a surprise.
      Second, in the early 2000s, I taught a class on police civil and criminal liability at Hamline University. Unfortunately, news of police misconduct and payouts for constitutional violations were a constant source of case studies for my students. I mentioned both of these points because they both frame my perspective on this report and suggest that there were many warnings ahead of the DOJ report.
      WT: How will the DOJ's report shape Minneapolis policing going forward?
      DS: The DOJ report comes with it a consent decree and federal monitoring of the city of Minneapolis. This is alongside a consent decree with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights. The city will be under legal obligation to undertake reforms. In the past, the city lacked the political will or ability to forge and implement reforms. The DOJ is asking for a lot of change — the question is whether the city can do this on its own or even as a result of possible litigation. Whatever happens, it is not going to occur overnight.
      WT: Have other cities in the United States entered into consent decrees with the federal government over policing? Have those agreements led to meaningful reforms?
      DS: Minneapolis is not alone. Albuquerque, New Mexico; Oakland, California; and Seattle, Washington; are but three examples of other cities that entered into consent decrees. The lesson from them is that reform is slow, complicated and expensive.
      Do not expect reforms overnight — it could take years to see meaningful change. Change is incremental and requires new training, new personnel, and perhaps millions of dollars to finance it. The story in these cities is that meaningful reform requires a change in political and organizational culture. This is never easy, but reform can happen.
      WT: You recently released your own report looking at how much local governments in Minnesota have paid to resolve police misconduct allegations. How much has Minneapolis paid out? How does the city compare to the rest of the state?
      DS: After Minneapolis paid out $27 million to the family of George Floyd, many wondered how much governments pay out for police misconduct. Reporters from across the country asked me this question. I told them that nationally there is no database on this, nor is there one in Minnesota or any state. In previous research, I made some estimates that the amount was in the billions. I decided to construct a database for Minnesota and did this with the help of some students.
      We surveyed all cities in Minnesota with populations of 5,000 or more; all 87 counties; and the State Patrol, Metro Transit, and the University of Minnesota Police. This produced an effective coverage of 98%-100% of the population of the state. Requests were sent to 239 governmental units asking for a list of all instances of police misconduct resulting in payouts from January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2020. Results were obtained from all 239 surveyed.
      Here is a summary of what we learned:
      • Nearly 30% of all governmental units made some form of payout.
      • There were 490 incidents that resulted in payouts.
      • The estimated total payout is $60,784,822.
      • The estimated total payment for Minneapolis is $36,535,708.10.
      • Minneapolis accounted for 60.1% of total payouts in the state.
      For the entire state, the mean or average payout per incident was $124,500. For Minneapolis alone, the mean or average payout was $212,416. The mean or average for the rest of the state excluding Minneapolis was $76,255.
      In Minneapolis, the median payout is between $26,282 and $28,010. For the rest of the state, it is $6,500. The overall median payout was $12,000.
      WT: What else do we know about the incidents that resulted in payouts?
      DS: My report asked for information about instances resulting in payouts, and they included use of force, property damage, improper and improper use of data, among other instances. However, the largest category was unspecified. We simply do not know or have sufficient data to tell us whether race or other factors were involved in an incident.
      We need mandated statewide collection and standardization of data about police misconduct if we are going to seriously think about any policy change when it comes to policing.
      WTHow does your report connect to the DOJ's findings?
      DS: First, the DOJ report is only about Minneapolis. My report is statewide. Two, my report covers all instances of police misconduct which resulted in payouts. Third, the DOJ report gathers its own statistics to analyze, while my report is based on an analysis of self-reported data from governmental agencies. Fourth, the DOJ was able to discuss and examine race issues in Minneapolis. My statewide report lacked the data to do that.
      Another way to view how the reports interact is in the focus on Minneapolis. The two reports look at different time frames but reach parallel conclusions on issues such as payouts for misconduct. But what jumps out is that the total instances of misconduct in Minneapolis and statewide may be higher than thought.
      WT: Given the DOJ's findings, has Minneapolis paid about what you would expect to resolve police misconduct claims?
      DS: I think Minneapolis has probably paid far less than it should. The DOJ report indicates thousands if not hundreds of potential situations where excessive or inappropriate force was used, or individuals were stopped in violation of their constitutional rights. Yet there were only 172 payouts reported for Minneapolis over the 10-year period I looked at.
      If the DOJ report is accurate, there could have possibly been hundreds of other instances that should have resulted in payouts. Why the underreporting?
      WT: Why do you think those other incidents did not result in payouts?
      DS: What I discuss in my report is that in Minneapolis, and perhaps across the state and nationally, those who receive payouts are perhaps only a small fraction of those whose rights have been abused. For many, they do not know their rights were violated or they do not have the resources, such as an attorney, to mount the legal challenges to sue or negotiate compensation. Perhaps some fear retribution or perhaps some are not sympathetic plaintiffs who are in a position to fight for their rights.
      While in general police do a good job under difficult situations, the scope of police misconduct outlined in the DOJ report suggests the cost of this misconduct in terms of violations of constitutional rights may be greater than I estimated. Finally, I have spoken to other researchers gathering information suggesting the cost to victims in terms of medical bills, psychological damage, etc., may also suggest victims have been undercompensated.
      Notes
      1 https://bit.ly/437oFGE
      2 https://bit.ly/44dwVFM
      3https://bit.ly/435WCXU
      By Josh Numainville

      Sunday, June 18, 2023

      Policing in Minneapolis and Across Minnesota: What Two Reports Say

       

      Two recent reports describe challenges for policing  specifically for Minneapolis and Minnesota more generally.  The first report was the Department of Justice’s Report on policing in Minneapolis that ties into a federal consent decree for reform in that city.  The second report is mine regarding what we know about policing across the State of Minnesota.

      Minneapolis and the Department of Justice Report

                  The Department of Justice initiated an investigation into police practices in the City of Minneapolis (MPD) after the murder of George Floyd.  The report is perhaps the  most comprehensive ever done on policing in Minneapolis, with a more detailed analysis and use of statistics than the Minnesota Department of Human Rights Report from last year.  The latter report had concluded  “A pattern or practice of discrimination is present where the denial of rights consists of something more than isolated, sporadic incidents, but is repeated, routine, or of a generalized nature.”

      The basic takeaway from the DOJ report is that the police department violated the First (free speech) and Fourth (illegal search and seizure) Amendment rights systematically, especially in terms of its application of use of force against people of color.

                  In reaching that conclusion it is first important to understand two points concerning the DOJ Report.  First, its focus is on the  use of (excessive) force.  It did look at other issues such as police stops and what is often called racial profiling, but most of the report examined racial disparities in terms of use of force.  Second, the US Supreme Court has said that questions of use of force raise constitutional questions, defining them as a Fourth Amendment search and seizure issue.

                  Overall the picture the report paints of Minneapolis is  troubling.   It introduces us to a point many of us have made for years in places such as here and here—Minneapolis is a tale of two cities.  As the Report states: 

      By nearly all of these measures, the typical white family in the Twin Cities is doing better than the national average for white families, and the typical Black family in the Twin Cities doing worse than the national average or Black families. The median Black family in the Twin Cities earns just 44% as much as the median white family, and the poverty rate among Black households is nearly five times higher than the rate among white households. Of the United States’ 100 largest metropolitan areas, only one has a larger gap between Black and white earnings.

       

      The cause of the racial disparities are many, but when it comes to policing, the DOJ offers several stark  conclusions.  In examining thousands of uses of force, the Report concluded:

       

      Our investigation showed that MPD officers routinely use excessive force, often when no force is necessary. We found that MPD officers often use unreasonable force (including deadly force) to obtain immediate compliance with orders, often forgoing meaningful de-escalation tactics and instead using force to subdue people. MPD’s pattern or practice of using excessive force violates the law.

       

      MPD officers often used neck restraints in situations that did not end in an arrest. MPD officers used neck restraints during at least 198 encounters from January 1, 2016, to August 16, 2022.

       

      Despite banning neck restraints  in 2020, the MPD still used them.

       

      The Report documents the use of unnecessary or excessive force across a range of tactics that include physical restraint, tasers, and weapons.  And there appears to be a racial disparity in such use of force.

       

      Additionally, the MPD fails to provide needed medical care and officers are failing to intervene  to prevent other officers from using excessive force.

       

      The DOJ Report also describes disparate treatment when it comes to traffic stops and searches. For example, it concludes that “We estimate that MPD stops Black people at 6.5 times the rate at which it stops white people, given their shares of the population. Similarly, we estimate  MPD stops Native American people at 7.9 times the rate at which it stops white people, given population shares.”

       

      Finally, the Report documents significant violations of the First Amendment rights of protestors and the media to cover, photograph, or report on police misconduct. 

       

      Overall the Report reaches a series of conclusions that the Minneapolis Police Department is out of compliance with the Constitution, in part as a result of poor or improper training or supervision. Necessitating the  City enter into a consent decree and agree to remedial action.  

       

      The Price of Injustice: Taxpayer Payouts for Police Misconduct in Minnesota

       

      But is Minneapolis alone?  This is the question I sought to answer in my report that was recently released and updated. 

       

      After Minneapolis paid out $27 million to the family of George Floyd  many wondered how much governments payout for police misconduct.  Nationally there is no database on this, nor is there one in Minnesota or any state.  In previous research I made some estimates that the amount was in the billions. I decided to construct a database for Minnesota.

       

      We surveyed all cities in Minnesota with populations of 5,000 or more;  all 87 counties; and the State Patrol, Metro Transit, and the University of Minnesota Police.  This produced an effective coverage of 98%-100% of the population of the state.  Requests were sent to a total of 239 governmental units asking for  a list of all instances of police misconduct resulting in payouts from January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2020.  Results were obtained from all 239 surveyed.

       

      Here is a summary of what we learned.

       

      Nearly 30% of all governmental units made some form of payout.

       

      There were a total of  490 incidents that resulted in payouts.

       

      The estimated  total payout is  $60,784,822.

       

      The estimated total payment for Minneapolis is $36,535,708.10.

       

      Minneapolis accounted for 60.1% of total payouts in the state during the ten-year time period.

       

      For the entire state the mean or average payout per incident was $124,500.  For Minneapolis alone, the mean or average payout was $212, 416.   The mean or average for the rest of the state excluding Minneapolis was $76, 255. 

       

      In Minneapolis the median payout is between $26,282 and $28,010.  For the rest of the state it is $6,500.  The overall median pay out was $12,000.

       

      My report also asked for information about instances resulting in payouts, and they included use of force, property damage, improper  and improper use of data, among other instances. However, the largest category was unspecified.  We simply do not know or have sufficient data to tell us the factors such as race that led to specific  police misconduct.

       

      The conclusion of the study was that gathering this data was difficult and time consuming and there is still too much we do not know.  I conclude that we need mandated statewide collection and standardization of data about police misconduct if we are going to seriously think about any policy change when it comes to policing.

       

      How the Two Reports Interact

       

      First, the DOJ report is only about Minneapolis.  My report is statewide.  Two, my report covers all instances of police misconduct which resulted in payouts.  Third, the DOJ report gathers its own statistics to analyze, while my report is based on an analysis of self-reported  data from the governmental agencies.  Fourth, the DOJ was able to discuss and examine race issues in Minneapolis, my statewide report lacked the data to do that.

       

      One pushback I received on my report is that not all instances of misconduct are really misconduct.  However, the information reported here is self-reported and governmental entities could  have opted not to report if they did not deem it misconduct.  Two, even if police disagree, my report documented misconduct resulting in settlements by the reporting governmental entity.  Whatever happened the reporting jurisdiction decided that they had to make payouts for what their police did.

       

      However, another way to view how the reports interact is in the focus on Minneapolis.  The two reports look at different time frames but reach parallel conclusions on  issues such as payouts for misconduct.   But what jumps out is that  the total instances of misconduct in Minneapolis and statewide may be higher than thought.

       

      My study reports 172 instances in Minneapolis over a ten-year period that resulted in payouts for police misconduct.  If the DOJ report is accurate, there could have possibly been hundreds of other  instances that  should have resulted in payouts.  Why the under-reporting?

       

      In my study I hypothesize that  of all the instances  where police and civilians interact, only a fraction of them may be circumstances where something goes wrong. Of those, only a fraction involve situations where civilians know something went wrong and then file a complaint or lawsuit and then of those, only some result in payouts. What the DOJ report suggests is that the number and percentage of misconduct in Minneapolis is probably greater than my report indicates.  This too may be true statewide.

       

      Overall, the conclusion of my report is that we need to understand what happened in the instances where payouts occurred and  use them as case studies to help formulate policy change. The DOJ diagnoses the problems in Minneapolis and offers recommendations for change. Whether what is happening in Minneapolis is generalizable to all of Minnesota we still do not know, and neither the DOJ or my report can answer that question.