Tuesday, March 22, 2022

Friedman’s ‘The World is Flat’ Hasn’t Aged Well

 This blog originally appeared in The International Policy Digest.



Back in 2005, The World is Flat, Thomas Friedman’s best-seller, prophesied if not promised a globally integrated, and what he called, a flat and frictionless world economy. The winners would be those who fully embraced such a future, the losers would be those outside who resisted it. From the vantage point of 2005, the world did look flat and the future frictionless. But from the commanding heights of 2022, in a world marked by a global pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, such a picture looks less likely, with the world looking increasingly bumpy and less integrated, at least along the lines envisioned by Friedman.

The thesis is that the pandemic and the war in Ukraine are only one of several challenges to a globalized world that have been emerging in the years since Friedman penned his bestseller and that even after we emerge from the pandemic at some point there are many dangers that continue to threaten a global vision of the world. In effect, for the near future, the world appears to be bumpy and rift with friction.

The Multipolar, Bipolar and Unipolar Worlds

On one level, the story of globalization is the tale of human history. From the day humans left Africa and migrated across the world, globalization began. Yet the modern story starts after the Second World War.

Post-Second World War, it was the Cold War division that created the bipolar world divided between the U.S. and democratic capitalist states from authoritarian communist states, leaving a few remaining unaligned ones. Yet the very words of the era, East versus West, First World versus Second World, North versus South, Aligned versus Unaligned, all pointed to the bipolar world we lived in.

But of all that came to a crash in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and then the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. Writers such as Francis Fukuyama in his 1992 The End of History and the Last Man proclaimed the end of history and the victory of Western democratic capitalism. We won, they lost, the world was unipolar headed by the victorious United States

The 1990s and the early part of the twentieth century was an era of globalization and integration. The 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement was one of many conventions that sought to integrate the global economy. The founding of the World Trade Organization in 1995 and the coming of age of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) worked to bring down trade barriers. In Europe, the maturing of the European Union with the Maastricht Treaty (1992), Lisbon Treaty (2007), and the expansion of membership at its peak to twenty-eight member states all were clear proof of a globalized world.

Enter Friedman’s Flat World

It is at the juncture at the beginning of the twenty-first century that Friedman’s The World is Flat makes its first appearance.

Friedman saw globalization as having gone through three stages that have metaphorically reduced the world from large to small. Version 1.0 (1492-1800) shrank the world from large to medium. The agent of change was brawn, and it was about countries and muscles.

Version 2.0 (1800-2000) shrank the world from medium to small. It was directed by multinational corporations going global for markets and labor. It was at first driven by falling transportation costs, then the telecommunications revolution, and then the Internet. Version 3.0 (2000- present) shrinks the world even smaller and flattens the playing field. It is directed by individuals seeking to collaborate and compete globally and it is made possible by software and fiber optic networks.

Globalization version 3.0 is driven by what Friedman calls ten flatteners, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, open-sourcing, out-shoring, supply-chaining, insourcing, and the creation of Microsoft Windows, and Google. These ten flatteners were subject to three convergences. Convergence one is the “complementary convergence of the ten flatteners, creating this new global playing field for multiple forms of collaboration.” Convergence two is the rise of business schools, IT specialists, CEOs, and workers comfortable with and able to develop horizontal collaborations who developed “business practices and skills that would get the most out of the flat world.” Convergence three is the introduction of new players—three billion—into a new playing field with new processes and horizons for collaboration. Overall, the ten flatteners and three convergences were yielding a frictionless flat world.



 

From a heady vantage point of 2005, Friedman looked correct, much like Fukuyama seemed prescient a few years earlier. Noble Prize Winner and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman among others were beside themselves in proclaiming the virtues of NAFTA and world trade. They dismissed cranks such as Ross Perot who earlier in his 1992 run for the presidency warned that the “giant sucking sound” of free trade would take jobs away from many Americans, or that the benefits would disproportionally fall to a few, and the burdens to others.

Disrupters of the Global Vision

Despite the rosy picture painted by Friedman, there were early signs that the flat world was not necessarily the future. The ascension of Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2000 and the terrorist attacks first in the United States on September 11, 2001, and then subsequent ones in Spain and Great Britain among others were another sign that open borders might need to give way to security concerns.

Since then, it has become increasingly clear that the future is not necessarily flat. If history hitherto fore was marked by patterns of convergence and divergence, as we move into the third decade of the twenty-first century, the brief history that Friedman proclaimed for this century may now be marked by the world becoming bumpy. If Friedman sees flatteners and convergence, there are several disrupters challenging the global vision.

What are these disrupters?


The 2008 Global Financial Crisis. The rapidity of the crash as it spread from the U.S. revealed the limits and problems of economic integration. The problem started with the mortgage lending markets in the U.S. where banks had every incentive to offer home loans but little incentive to ensure the loans were actually good and made to creditworthy individuals. Banks made the loans, often with little credit checks as was the case with New Century Financial, and then bundled them up and sold them on the secondary loan markets, with foreign banks, such as those in China or in Europe, buying these portfolios. When margins were called in 2008, and institutions such as Bear Sterns lacked the capital to honor them, it triggered a global financial panic that brought down the “too big to fail” in the U.S. and brought on the Great Recession across the world.


2011 Syrian refugee crisis. The 2011 Syrian civil war was only the first of several conflicts that triggered a demand to close borders. The 2021 efforts by Belarus to use refugees as weapons against Lithuania and Poland played upon fears of a new refugee crisis. In the U.S., Donald Trump successfully ran for president in 2016 on fears of an invasion of refugees from the South and Latin America, proclaiming them as rapists and murderers.


Rising nationalism. The Great Recession of 2008, as well as the 2011 refugee crisis, helped flame a new nationalism across the world. Free trade agreements and open borders made it look like conventions such as the European Union were simply an open invitation for a country to be flooded with others, potentially damaging the ethnic or racial mix of the current population. Marine Le Pen in France and Viktor Orbán in Hungary were but two examples of how rising nationalism fueled new political movements in those countries. Trumpism in the U.S., resulting in the Muslim travel ban, demands to build the border wall, and policies of asylum while you wait outside the U.S., were examples of this.


New Economic Nationalism. Trump’s “Make America Great” was not simply the product of a personality. Trump was the product of a convergence of many forces, some racial, but many economic that had been brewing for many years. Free trade and automation may have made some Americans very wealthy, but the burdens as noted above fell heavily upon the working class. In the 1990s, ivory-tower economists such as Paul Krugman cheerleaded NAFTA and free trade, but not until it became obvious that we were not all winners did he and a few others concede that perhaps they missed something in the chalkboard models. The public was never and is still not as enthusiastic and sold on free trade as tenured professors are.

Brexit. Arguably on one level the British vote in 2016 to leave the European Union and then the actual departure at the end of 2020 is one of the clearest signs of a world becoming bumpy and less frictionless. Brexit is built on the economic and racial anxieties discussed above as well as nationalism. The geography and demographics of the vote reflected clear patterns across the UK in terms of perceptions of where and who was losing and winning in the EU membership.

Geopolitics. Even before the Russian invasion of Ukraine it looks less and less like the end of history has arrived and America has won.

In Russia one finds Putin lamenting the breakup of the USSR as the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century and he appears bent on re-establishing the lost empire. The Eurasian Economic Union, unification or cooperation agreements with Belarus and the invasion of Ukraine to force it within its sphere of influence demonstrate Russia remains a major player. In fact, the 2022 Russian invasion represents perhaps the most abrupt proof that globalization is both alive and dead.

China too is testing U.S. global dominance. The Belt and Road Initiative is its effort to expand its global economic influence. Its growing military confidence in the Pacific, the repression of self-rule in Hong Kong, and impatience with Taiwan’s independence and desires to resolve unification soon demonstrate the challenge to U.S. supremacy. Moreover, under Donald Trump, across the world, many countries questioned the U.S. willingness and resolve to organizations such as NATO. Even after the Russian invasion, many still question American resolve, especially after Afghanistan.

Climate change. If ever there was a challenge that demanded a concerted global response it is climate change and the warming of the Earth. While there have been several efforts at the international level to address environmental issues, including most recently the 2015 Paris Agreement, and the 2021 COP26 agreement, little progress has actually been made to slow climate change. The U.S. and China remain the biggest polluters but have little incentive to change. It is within the interest of Brazil to continue to deforest the Amazon even though doing so speeds up the warming of the planet. Climate change is opening up new frontiers of conflict.

Big Tech pushback. Friedman’s The World is Flat championed the likes of Google as levelers in the new frictionless world. They were among the forces of convergence. More than 15 years later, Google, Microsoft, and now the rise of the social media with Facebook look less as friendly integrators but more as disrupters. The global dominance of Big Tech is seen as a threat in many ways. Big Tech and especially the social media giants are seen as causes of conflict and polarization, especially as stories of how Facebook’s algorithms seem to encourage hate speech and fake news.

The pandemic. If any event has torn apart the fabric of the frictionless unipolar world it has been the emergence of the pandemic beginning in 2019. Nearly from its start, it has led to the closing of borders, interruptions in migration, the closing, opening, and reclosing of businesses and economies, and even conspiracy theories regarding the origin of the pandemic. Trump’s effort to label the pandemic as the “China virus” revealed the merger of nationalism, ethnic rivalry, and racism attached to the fears of the origins and spread of the virus.

Supply chain problems. A tenth disrupter has been the resulting supply chain problems accompanying the pandemic. In the initial stages of the pandemic, countries hoarded medical supplies such as face masks. Stories of ships carrying them being recalled ran wild as either urban legends or true. What the U.S. experienced, along with many other countries, were problems in supply chains, as often raw materials or necessary components or parts were stuck on ships or in distant ports offshore.

Businesses, seeing the problems of depending on offshore supply chains, are rethinking plant location. In late 2021, Samsung announced the construction of a new $17 billion facility outside of Austin, Texas so that it would not be cut short in the chips it needs for its cellphones and other devices. Other businesses may follow suit. Countries too may also feel that they can no longer depend on other states to make other critical goods such as medical supplies. The pandemic will force a rethinking of the value of spreading operations across the globe.

Several events since the publication of The World is Flat question the flat, frictionless integrated, and perhaps unipolar world that seemed inevitable then. In the last 17 years, several disrupters have made the world bumpier, with many left wondering if a planet with more friction would be more desirable, or at least more likely. Today, the future of the next part of the twenty-first century looks less like what Friedman envisioned and more like a refutation of his prophecy.



International Law, War Crimes, and Ukraine

 This blog appeared in Fast Horse.


David Schultz Q&A

March 21, 2022

David Schultz forecasts next steps in the war in Ukraine.


“The U.S. seemed to think that with the end of the Cold War we won and Russia lost and Russia would simply accept the values of the West and join in. I learned from Lithuanian colleagues that the U.S. confused Russian security desires and thoughts of spheres of influence with that of the USSR such that with the latter gone the security threat from Russia would disappear. We were foolish to believe Russia would turn into a stable Western-style democracy. This is the same mistake we made in Afghanistan and Iraq and it all goes back to the arrogance of the U.S. in not understanding cultural differences.”


You have taught in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Have you been surprised by Putin’s move at this point in time? 

A decade ago I would have been surprised by Putin’s decision to invade. At that time Russia was a far weaker country and it looked as if it was integrating itself into a global financial system and therefore would have had too much to lose by invading. He enjoyed the support of the middle class who were experiencing rising incomes and some increase in personal freedoms. I saw both while teaching in Moscow. Russia and Putin looked content to be a regional power and a member of the European community, even if only a partial member. However, a lot changed in a decade.


For starters, Putin has been in office for 20 years. There is an arrogance of power that goes along with serving for that many years. Putin has consolidated power and is surrounded by a small number of yes men who do not serve as a check on his ideas.


I have also taught in Lithuania and many other former Soviet republics. What I learned from them is that Russia was always a threat. The U.S. seemed to think that with the end of the Cold War we won and Russia lost and Russia would simply accept the values of the West and join in. I learned from Lithuanian colleagues that the U.S. confused Russian security desires and thoughts of spheres of influence with that of the USSR such that with the latter gone the security threat from Russia would disappear. We were foolish to believe Russia would turn into a stable Western-style democracy. This is the same mistake we made in Afghanistan and Iraq and it all goes back to the arrogance of the U.S. in not understanding cultural differences. This is what Frances FitzGerald wrote about in Fire in the Lake where that book described our mistakes and assumptions about Vietnam.


Russia did not really join the West. Lithuania is now saying I told you so.


The U.S. encouraged Putin’s behavior by complacency. Obama’s pivot to Asia underscored Russia’s threat and Trump’s relationship with Putin also enabled Putin.  While by the time Biden became president much of the die may have been cast, Biden initially did not help in the sense of appearing to appease Russia or indicate what it would not do. After Afghanistan and earlier, when Obama did not act when he gave Syria an ultimatum on chemical weapons, gave Putin reason to think the U.S. would not act here if he went after Ukraine.


I am currently finishing a book written with colleagues from the Lithuanian Military Academy and Mykolas Romeris University. I have taught at both schools. The book looks at European security arrangements at a time when the U.S. may no longer be there or be a reliable partner in protecting Europe. Many in Eastern Europe are skeptical that the U.S. will fight for them if Russia goes further than Ukraine. They argue that the U.S. does not appreciate the threat that the Russian invasion of Ukraine poses to them and Europe and they see what is happening now as a test for U.S. reliability.


Do you hold out hope that there will be legal consequences for Putin at the Hague or in a law setting for his criminal actions? 

The International Court of Justice, which is a court of the United Nations, already issued a preliminary ruling saying that Russia’s military action against Ukraine was illegal and it should stop. That is an important ruling but Russia is disobeying it. Moreover, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it can veto a decision by that body seeking enforcement of the ICJ decision.


What role can legal justice play going forward? 

This is a unique case but there are parallels. During the Reagan Administration there was a decision by the ICJ against the U.S. It ruled that its arming of the contras in Nicaragua along with other aggressive action violated international law. Per se it did not deter the U.S.


However, having rulings against a country such as the U.S. or now Russia hurts a state’s standing in international politics. It adds legitimacy to sanctions and other measures to support Ukraine. It takes away legal arguments from Russia and it isolates them.


Putin historically like to use international law as window dressing for actions such as taking Crimea. This makes it harder for him to legitimize his decisions when the international community comes out against him and Russia.


Do you have a sense that the global community will keep legal restrictions on Russia for a period of time, to enforce sanctions, even after, hopefully, the military action subsides?

This is the big question. It is about the resolve of the U.S. and the world to secure short term objectives and then also what the long term goals are. If the short-term objective is end the war and get Russia out of Ukraine, then it may make sense to end some restrictions if Russia complies. If there is a larger longer-term goal to isolate Russia and force behavioral change, it may be a different story.


Does the U.N. have an enforcement mechanism to enforce reparations?

Maybe. The possible reparations may come from assets seized from the Russian Central Bank and other sources. If the war ended today the estimated cost of rebuilding is more than $100 billion. Someone has to pay for this. Even if it makes sense to put Ukraine in the European Union, it should not have to pay for violations of international law by Russia. There is a basic principle here that no one should profit from their own wrongs or escape accountability.


Reparations may make sense but the lesson of reparations from Germany after World War I is that they can backfire and cause other problems. The Russian people should not pay for the choices of the government.


You’ve written that Russia may be attempting to move the global order back to the 19th century. Can international law play a role to prevent this from happening?

International law norms are partially in place because of voluntary compliance. Russia now is challenging the post-World War II order, or even a post-Cold War order, it never accepted. The issue now is how united the world is in enforcing this new order and not allowing backsliding to old-fashioned power politics.


Do you hold out any hope for legal thinkers inside Russia to emerge to restore order? 

News out of Russia right now is hard to secure. I do know via friends that there is significant dissent with the country, including among legal thinkers, about the war and the direction Russia is taking. The sanctions are going to force an internal social and political battle and it will be interesting to see if and when the middle class and oligarchs revolt and how far Putin will go to suppress this.


When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 one East German guard fired on individuals. The rest refused to shoot fellow Germans. I wonder and fear if that will happen in Russia.


Many Russians have family in Ukraine or vice-versa. I again wonder at what point Russian soldiers lose resolve to fight or kill people who look like them or whom they may be related to.


What are your memories of your time in Ukraine? Did you get to know Kyiv or other cities well?

I taught in Kyiv and Kharkiv. I have friends, colleagues, and former students in both. I have great memories.


In Kyiv I taught at the Taras Shevchenko National University in a gorgeous red building across from a lovely park. I remain in contact with many there. I had a lovely time at the opera house where I saw a show with a colleague. I visited Maidan Square and some museums. I did a program for the US Embassy there.


I taught at Simon Kuznets University in Kharkiv. What I loved about the school was that between classes they played classical music on the intercom. I was in a gorgeous building with stunning stained glass. I visited the performing arts center and toured the wonderful architecture. That city was the Soviet-era capital for Ukraine. I also lectured at Kharkiv University. Former students sent me a video showing the building where I lectured got blown up by the Russians. Other buildings I was in are gone now too. My closest colleague from Simon Kuznets I have not heard from in two weeks. Another person I knew who had a horse farm left with her kids and has fled to Albania leaving other family behind. It was sort of a Sophie’s choice move.


I am in daily contact with people from Ukraine and I miss them and wish I could do more.


I also hear from friends in Belarus and Russia. We want to make sure to stay friends despite what happens in the world.


There is a great line from the end of the movie Casablanca where Rick says to Ilsa: “Ilsa, I’m no good at being noble, but it doesn’t take much to see that the problems of three little people don’t amount to a hill of beans in this crazy world.”


We are trying to make sure that this crazy world does not upset deep and long friendships. But we all fear that each email or call will be the last one.


When a global power becomes a pariah on the world stage, what does history tell us about how legal measures can and should be used to keep a bad actor in a state of reasonable punishment?


Any predictions on how this conflict may resolve itself?

The lessons of history are not good. Often the world reacts to put that actor in place, such as after World War I, World War II, or even further back in time, with Napoleon, but the punishment is generally quite ugly.


Right now we are seeing the greatest test of the post-World War II legal order ever. Will economic sanctions, public opinion, and cyber operations prevail in the enforcement of a new legal regime or will we revert back to a previous era. It may be time to reread two post-World War II books. Humanism and Terror by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Darkness at Noon by Arthur Koestler. Both capture a moment in time during the Cold War that may have returned.

Sunday, March 20, 2022

 MARCH 18, 2022

This blog originally appeared in Counterpunch.

War, Generations, and Historical Memory

 



Historical memory is fleeting. Quickly we forget the past. This is especially the case when the past truly is the past. By that, those who experienced it are no longer alive and we need to rely upon second-hand memory to learn about it. This is exactly the situation occurring in the world now as the memory of World War II is fading and the Russian invasion of Ukraine is forcing comparisons to it.

Philosopher George Santayana is famous for declaring that “Those who fail to learn the lessons of history are doomed to repeat it.” Similarly philosopher Georg Hegel declared that “The only lesson of history is that we do not learn from history.” These aphorisms speak to the fading of memory as experience of events turn from first-hand to second-hand accounts. Historical memory is generational.

Each new generation comes of age in its adolescence coming to experience some major event or events that form a collective identity. These are the events that those in that generation refer to when they say: “Where were you when?” or they become shorthand markers or referents for emotions or assumptions about the world that influence how they think and perceive the world. There is a generational set of values, grounded in a set of historical memories and experiences.

This generational influence plays itself out 20 or so years later as a previous generation influenced by the experiences of its adolescence exits and is replaced by a new generation now prepared to act on its values formed in its adolescence. Political change in part is driven by generation shifts, with each new generation acting on its first-hand historical memories while forgetting the first-hand political memories of a previous generation.

This is the world we live in now, with so many consequential experiences fading away, lost forever in terms of the immediacy of the lessons learned from them.

At present there are two generations in the US, the Silents born between 1924 and 1944, and the Baby Boomers, born between 1945 and 1960 (or 1964 for some) who grew up in a world defined by many events they experienced first-hand. The list includes the Great Depression, the New Deal, World War II, the Cold War, the Korean War, the 1960s, and the assassinations of the Kennedys and Martin Luther King, Jr. As these generations exit they are replaced by a new generation of Millennials (1982-1996) and GenZ (1997-2010) who lack the direct historical memory of the previous generations. It may even be that they lack a secondary memory of a parent or grandparent who experienced these events.

Why is this generation shift important? Consider for those who lived through the rise of Hitler and World War II. The saw futile efforts by UK Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to appease Hitler by giving him part of Czechoslovakia and declaring “Peace for our time,” only to see Germany roll into Poland barely a year later. They also experience the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the death and horror of World War II, and the genocide of Jews and others across Europe. These were not distant memories, but facts of their lived experiences.

Now the people who lived all this will soon be gone. Soon we will live in a world where there are no Holocaust survivors, refugees from World War II, or veterans of that war. First-hand memories and experiences of these people will be gone and new generations lacking such experiences will come of age and lead the country. What will the lessons of history be? How much will be lost as Santayana and Hegel foretold?

Generational memory is not limited to the US. Generational shifts are occurring across Europe, including in Russia and Ukraine. Vladimir Putin was born seven years after World War II. He has no direct experience of it and he was barely one-year old when Stalin died. Putin grew up in a world defined by the Cold War, when in his mind the USSR was great and there were clear geopolitical lines that defined the world. He has forgotten the pain of war inflicted on his country by the Nazis and he seems to think that the world he grew up with Ukraine and the former Soviet republics part of Russian empire is how the world out to be today.

But Putin’s generational world is coming to an end. Half if not more of the populations of Russia, Ukraine, and other states in the region grew up after the fall of the Berlin Wall and breakup of the USSR. They have collective memories far different than those of generations passing away. In my nearly 15 years of teaching in Eastern and Central Europe and Russia I have been forecasting that the real generational change would occur when the World War II and Cold War generations pass and are replaced.

The good news is that a new generation has a chance to reinvent the world and Putin might ultimately fail to win against the hands of generational change. The bad news, as we are seeing with the Russian invasion against Ukraine, is that the lessons of history are often forgotten.